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I. INTRODUCTION
When the United States terminated the Trust Territory of the Pa-
cific Islands, it left behind a legal imprint deeply inscribed on Microne-
sian culture and society. The Micronesians have since struggled with
this legacy. Like other decolonized areas around the world, there contin-
ues to be a clash between the transplanted legal system and the indige-
nous culture. The people of Micronesia viewed independence as a long-
awaited opportunity, a chance to draw up a new system that was their
* S.J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School; J.D., 1983, Boston University School of Law;
B.S., 1980, University of Oregon.
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own, that matched the Micronesian way. As this article will illustrate,
this optimism has not been rewarded.
This article will focus on this issue from the standpoint of the judici-
ary. First, relevant decisions of the Supreme Court of the Federated
States of Micronesia will be critically examined, delving beneath the legal
language to expose the reality that, despite appearances, the law contin-
ues to be exclusively derived from the United States and it has not ac-
comodated custom or social-cultural aspects of Micronesian life.
Nothing has changed. Second, to offer insight into why this has hap-
pened, similar situations around the world will be surveyed, drawing
heavily from anthropological studies.
This article will argue that the prevailing methods relied upon in
decolonized areas to make legal systems indigenous, which are uniformly
directed toward incorporating customary law norms into the legal sys-
tem, cannot succeed. Despite the overall failure of these various strate-
gies, they continue to be doggedly applied. These strategies actually lead
to an entrenched dualistic system which will have the long term effect of
perpetuating a sharp division in the society. Finally, this article proposes
a reorientation of the legal system which begins with a simple but essen-
tial change in attitude.
II. FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
A. Constitution and Judicial Guidance Clause
The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is one of the four distinct
political entities to arise out of the United States administered Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands.' After over a century of foreign domina-
tion-successively under the Spanish, Germans, Japanese, and
Americans 2-the people of Micronesia finally gained political indepen-
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 39TH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ON
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 1 (1987). The
other three entities are the Republic of Belau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). Of the original Trust Territories
only CNMI decided against independent status. See Leibowitz, The Marianas Covenant Nego-
tiations, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 19 (1981).
2. See generally E. COCKRUM, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN MICRONESIA (1970).
Spain exerted control over the Caroline Islands, the geographical area of the FSM in 1874. Id.
at 35. Germany purchased the islands from Spain after the Spanish-American War and held
them until World War I. Id. at 64, 74-75. Then Japan gained control over the area under a
League of Nations Mandate. See Mandate for the Former German Possessions in the Pacific
Ocean Lying North of the Equator, 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 84, 87-88 (1922), reprinted in
42 Stat. 2149, 12 L.N.T.S. 202 (1922). Following World War II, the United States became the
administering authority under the United Nations created Trusteeship. See Trusteeship
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dence on November 3, 1986,3 as a new nation in the international com-
munity.4 Independence was achieved in several transitional steps,
beginning with negotiations, followed by the drafting and ratification of a
constitution, the assumption of executive, legislative, and judicial func-
tions, and finally the execution of the agreement with the United States
to terminate the Trusteeship.
Similar to other formerly colonized areas in the Pacific region, the
reassertion of custom and tradition became a predominant refrain, coa-
lescing the people of Micronesia in their exertion of self-governance. At
the Micronesian Constitutional Convention, held in 1975 with delegates
from the entire region, concern about the future role of custom and tradi-
tional leaders permeated many of the critical issues.' Although the
"modernists" and the "traditionalists" differed sharply about the extent
to which custom should be incorporated into the constitution, there was
an underlying consensus that some measure of protection and perpetua-
tion was necessary.6 The product of this Convention was the Constitu-
tion of the Federated States of Micronesia, ratified on July 12, 1978, by
Yap, Pohnpei, Truk, and Kosrae.7 These four ratifying areas form sepa-
rate states within the FSM, bound to the FSM Constitution in an ar-
rangement similar to that of the states in the United States.8 In many
respects the FSM Constitution and the form of government it sets out is
almost identical to that of the United States, with a three branch system
Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, 61 Stat. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, 8
U.N.T.S. 189-90 (approved by United States on July 18, 1947).
3. See PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR MICRONESIAN STATUS NEGOTI-
ATIONS, COMPILATION OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE FREELY ASSOCIATED STATE OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
(1987).
4. Whether the FSM has independent nation status under international law is open to
debate because the United States dissolved the Trusteeship without the required approval of
the U.N. Security Council. See Recent Development, The Compact of Free Association: An
End to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 213 (1987).
5. See N. MELLER, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN MICRONESIA 261-81 (1977).
6. Id. at 262.
7. Burdick, The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, 8 U. HAW. L. REV.
419, 429 (1986). There were also delegates from the Marianas, Palau, and the Marshalls. The
Marianas had already agreed to a Covenant with the United States to become a Common-
wealth, so they did not vote on ratification. Id. at 426. Voters in Palau and the Marshalls
rejected the Constitution and later formed their own separate republics. Id. at 429. The effec-
tive date of the Constitution is July 12, 1979, one year following ratification. FSM CONST. art.
XVI, § 1.
8. See generally Suldan v. FSM (II), 1 F.S.M. Intrm. 339, 342-50 (Pon. 1983) ("Thus,
the Constitution allocates powers between state and national governments and among the ex-
ecutive, legislative and judicial branches of the national government but exercise of those pow-
ers must be in accordance with the [FSM] Constitution itself.").
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of government and a bill of rights, along with many other points of simi-
larity. Indeed much of the language was borrowed directly from the
United States Constitution.9
Two separate parts of the Constitution address custom and tradi-
tion. Article V of the Constitution is devoted exclusively to custom and
traditional leaders. The first section of this Article explicitly preserves
the "role or function of a traditional leader as recognized by custom and
tradition .... -1o Section 2 provides that "[t]he traditions of the people of
the Federated States of Micronesia may be protected by statute. If chal-
lenged as violative of Article IV [Declaration of Rights], protection of
Micronesian tradition shall be considered a compelling social purpose
warranting such governmental action."'" Due to the fact that customs
vary widely between states and even between areas within a state, legisla-
tive protection under this section was intended to occur primarily at the
state level. 12 The third section of Article V allows the Congress to estab-
lish a "Chamber of Chiefs consisting of traditional leaders" when needed,
and allows the states to provide functional roles for traditional leaders.' 3
Due to legislative inertia and the inherent difficulty of codifying custom,
no statutes have been enacted protecting specific traditions to date, and
only one state has provided traditional leaders with a role in the govern-
ment."' Thus, for practical purposes Article V has been inoperative.
A separate, more consequential provision in the Constitution relat-
ing to custom is contained in Article XI - the Section II Judicial Gui-
dance Clause - which reads: "Court decisions shall be consistent with
this Constitution, Micronesian customs and traditions, and the social and
9. See Suldan v. FSM (II), 1 F.S.M. Intrm. 339 (Pon. 1983) (similarity of constitutions
indicates power of judicial review in FSM court); Alaphonso v. FSM, 1 F.S.M. Intrm. 209,
214-215 (App. 1982) ("Most concepts and many actual words and phrases employed in the
Declaration of Rights come directly from the United States Constitution."). One major reason
for this resemblance is that legal staff members at the Convention were for the most part
American trained attorneys who simply borrowed language with which they were familiar.
See N. MELLER, supra note 5, at 196-201. In addition, the Micronesians had lived under the
American system for over three decades and perhaps for that reason felt comfortable retaining
it. Id.
10. FSM CONST. art. V, § 1.
11. FSM CONsT. art. V, § 2.
12. See Burdick, supra note 7, at 461 n.304; see also FSM CONST. preamble ("To make
one nation of many islands, we respect the diversity of our cultures.").
13. FSM CONST. art. V, § 3.
14. See generally Tamanaha, The Role of Custom and Traditional Leaders under the Yap
Constitution, 10 U. HAW L. REV. 81 (1988). The Yap Constitution provides for Councils of
traditional leaders which wield considerable governmental power, including absolute veto
power over legislation which concerns custom and tradition. Id. at 94-97.
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geographical configuration of Micronesia." 15 This clause was in effect a
repudiation of the former Trust Territory High Court's baneful treat-
ment of custom and tradition.16 The High Court had consistently disre-
garded or declared invalid customs which were in conflict with written
law or offensive to a particular judge's sense of justice. 17 Legislative his-
tory to this provision eloquently conveys the delegates' dismay at this
past treatment and expresses the desire to create a body of law more
appropriate to Micronesia and more solicitous of custom and tradition:
The intent and purpose of this provision is that future Microne-
sian courts base their decisions not on what has been done in the past
but on a new basis which will allow the consideration of the pertinent
aspects of Micronesian society and culture.
The failure to include such a provision in the Constitution may
cause the courts to follow the decisions of past Trust Territory cases or
various foreign decisions which have dealt with similar interpretive or
legal questions. This may be undesirable since much of the reasoning
utilized in these various courts may not be relevant here in Micronesia.
Micronesia is an island nation scattered over a large expanse of ocean.
Customary and traditional values are an important part of our society
and lifestyle. It is important that this constitution be interpreted in
light of our customs and traditions....
... [I]n the past the courts in the Trust Territory have copied to a
great extent English common law which the Committee feels is not'
18always a relevant basis for decision here in Micronesia....
These excerpts reflect a sophisticated awareness borne of experience
that laws based on Western models pose potential danger to the Microne-
sian way of life. Sadly, despite recognition by the FSM Supreme Court
that the "Judicial Guidance Clause was intended to have a pervasive ef-
fect on the decisionmaking of the Court,"19 a review of the reported deci-
15. FSM CONsT. art. XI, § 11.
16. See Burdick, supra note 7, at 477. Early versions of the Judicial Guidance Clause
explicitly declared that Trust Territory High Court decisions were not to bind FSM courts.
See I JOURNAL OF THE MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1975, at 419-21
(1976) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION]; Standing Committee Rep. No. 34, in 2
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra, at 821-22, 917.
17. See, eg., Ngiruhelbad v. Merii, 2 T.T.R. 631 (App. Div. 1961); Ngirasmengesong v.
Trust Territory, 1 T.T.R. 615 (App. Div. 1958); Trust Territory v. Lone Lino, 6 T.T.R. 7 (Tr.
Div. Marshall Is. 1972); see also Arnett, The American Legal System and Micronesian Custom-
ary Law: The Legal Legacy of the United States to the New Nations of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, 4 U.C.L.A. PAcIFIc BASIN L.J. 161, 192-97 (1985).
18. Standing Committee Report No. 34, supra note 16, at 822. The reference to English
common law is intended to refer to the use of American case law.
19. Semens v. Continental Airlines, 2 F.S.M. Intrm. 131, 139 (Pon. 1985).
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sions reveals virtually no change in the pattern of strict adherence to U.S.
common law doctrines.
B. Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia
Under Article XI of the Constitution, the "judicial power of the na-
tional government is vested in a Supreme Court and inferior courts estab-
lished by statute."2 Jurisdiction of the FSM Supreme Court is similar to
that of federal courts in the United States: "original and exclusive juris-
diction in cases affecting officials of foreign governments, disputes be-
tween states, admiralty or maritime cases, and in cases in which the
national government is a party except where an interest in land is at is-
sue;"21 and "concurrent original jurisdiction" in cases arising under the
national constitution, laws or treaties, and in diversity cases.2 2 The ex-
clusion of FSM court jurisdiction over cases dealing with land was again
a manifestation of the delegates' dislike of past rulings of the Trust Terri-
tory High Court.23 The Constitutional Convention delegates preferred
that land matters be dealt with by state officials, who "generally should
have greater knowledge of use, local custom and expectations concerning
land and personal property."'24
The FSM Supreme Court officially came into existence on May 5,
198 1,25 replacing the Trust Territory High Court26 and assuming juris-
diction over cases pursuant to the FSM Constitution.
Article XI authorizes the appointment of a Chief Justice and not
more than five Associate Justices to the FSM Supreme Court.2 7 Justices
sit on both the trial and appellate levels.28 However, "no justice may sit
with the appellate division in a case heard by him in the trial division."29
20. FSM CONST. art. XI, § 1. Thus far, no inferior courts on the national level have been
established.
21. Id. § 6(a).
22. Id. § 6(b).
23. Burdick, supra note 7, at 476.
24. In re Nahnsen, 1 F.S.M. Intrm. 97, 107 (Pon. 1982); see also Standing Committee
Report No. 33, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 16, at 814 ("The [legislative]
powers which your Committee contemplates will be reserved to the states including ... land
law ....").
25. Truk v. Otokichy, 1 F.S.M. Intrm. 127, 131 (Truk 1982); see also Turcott, The Begin-
nings of the Federated States of Micronesia Supreme Court, 5 U. HAW. L. REv. 361 (1983).
26. There were several disputes between the High Court and the FSM Supreme Court
regarding the transition and their respective authority. See Bowman, Legitimacy and Scope of
Trust Territory High Court Power to Review Decisions of Federated States of Micronesia
Supreme Court: The Otokichy Cases, 5 U. HAW. L. REV. 57 (1983).
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The first reported opinion of the FSM Supreme Court was issued on
August 3, 1981.30 The Court has operated continuously ever since, with
close to 150 decisions published by the end of 1988.31 From its inception,
the FSM Supreme Court has been exclusively comprised of Chief Justice
Edward C. King and Associate Justice Richard H. Benson. Due to the
dearth of indigenous attorneys, 32 both persons selected to be Justices
were American expatriates and no other judges have been added since
these first two were confirmed in 1980.3 1
Justice King sits as a trial judge alternating between Pohnpei and
Kosrae; Justice Benson does likewise in Truk and Yap.34 For appeals,
each justice forms a panel with two temporarily appointed judges to hear
cases tried by the other. Justice King in his capacity as Chief Justice
controls the selection of temporary judges who hear the appeals. 36 The
judges appointed to serve on the appellate panels are usually drawn from
the region, either local state court judges37 or judges from Guam, 38 Pa-
lau,39 or the Northern Mariana Islands,' although on occasion judges
have been selected from as far away as Hawaii and California.41 Thus, in
30. FSM v. Carl, I F.S.M. Intrm. I (Pon. 1981).
31. The complete set of court reports of the FSM Supreme Court consists of 3 volumes,
with the latest reported opinion, as of June 1989, being October 19, 1988. See Truk State v.
Maeda Const. Co., 3 F.S.M. Intrm. 487 (Truk 1988).
32. Most of the practicing lawyers in the FSM are American expatriate attorneys or Mi-
cronesian trial counselors without formal legal training. There is a small, increasing number of
Micronesians who have attended or are attending law school in the United States and in Papua
New Guinea. See Turcott, supra note 25, at 367-68.
33. Justice King graduated from Indiana University School of Law in 1964 and worked
for a private law firm as well as in various public service positions, including four years as
Deputy Director of the Micronesian Legal Services Corporation. Id. at 363. Justice Benson
graduated from the University of Michigan Law School in 1956, engaged in private practice in
South Carolina and Guam, and served as a judge in Guam for ten years. Id. at 364. Thus,
prior to their appointments both spent a significant amount of time in the region.
34. Id. at 362.
35. Id. at 362-63.
36. Id.
37. See, eg., Fred v. FSM, 3 F.S.M. Intrm. 141 (App. 1987) (Panel members were Justice
Benson, Mamoru Nakamura, a Supreme Court Judge from the Republic of Belau, and Edwel
H. Santos, a judge on the Pohnpei Supreme Court.).
38. See, e.g., In re Terpley (II), 3 F.S.M. Intrm. 145 (App. 1987) (Panel members were
Justice Benson, Peter C. Siquenza, Jr., of the Superior Court of Guam, and Ramon G. Vil-
lagomez of the CNMI trial court.).
39. See, e.g., Engichy v. FSM, 1 F.S.M. Intrm. 532 (App. 1984) (Panel members were
Justice King, Mamora Nakamura of Palau, and Herbert D. Soil of the CNMI trial court.).
40. See, eg., Alaphonso v. FSM, I F.S.M. Intrm. 209 (App. 1982) (Panel members were
Justice King, Alfred Laureta, a U.S. District Judge from CNMI, and Herbert D. Soil.).
41. See, eg., Andohn v. FSM, 1 F.S.M. Intrm. 433 (App. 1984) (Panel members were
Justice Benson, Samuel P. King, a United States District Judge from Hawaii, and Dorothy W.
Nelson, a judge from the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.). This case presents a good
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practice, on appellate cases Justice King and Justice Benson sit in judg-
ment on the correctness of the other's rulings, and, aside from these two,
there is little continuity in the identity of the judges who decide on final
interpretations of the FSM Constitution and laws. Moreover, in most
cases the majority of the members of a given appellate panel are not even
residents of the Federated States of Micronesia. Besides a lack of famili-
arity with the customs and laws of the FSM, the fact that panel members
are usually from other jurisdictions makes it likely they would naturally
tend to defer to the sole FSM judge on the panel, and most of the appel-
late decisions were drafted by Justice King and Justice Benson. Another
possible sign of this deference is that all appellate decisions to date have
been unanimous. Given this situation, the ability of Justice King and
Justice Benson to individually influence, if not control, the course of law
in the FSM is so magnified it can reasonably be asserted that the national
Constitution and laws mean what they determine them to be.
Patterns reflecting their individual differences can easily be dis-
cerned just on a descriptive basis. The vast bulk of reported decisions
thus far are from the trial court level. Justice King publishes opinions at
a rate about three times that of Justice Benson.42 Aside from this dispa-
rate frequency of published opinions, there is a marked difference in the
length and style of the opinions which are published. Opinions issued by
Justice King regularly exceed twenty pages in length and engage in wide-
ranging, exhaustive discussions of the law.43 Justice Bensons's opinions
seldom reach ten pages, and characteristically are tersely worded and
limited to resolution of matters necessary to the decision. 4' This differ-
ence is apparently a reflection of different perceptions of their judicial
example of the type of unusual problems which arise when a panel is drawn from distant
locations. A case from Georgia is cited in the opinion, with the following footnote: "South-
eastern Reporter is not available in the Federated States of Micronesia. The report is therefore
attached." Id. at 447 n.1. It is significant that decisions of the highest court in the FSM
contain cites to courts in states of which many Micronesians have surely never heard.
42. In Volume I of the court reporter, Justice King published thirty-three trial court opin-
ions as compared to seven opinions by Justice Benson. In Volume II, Justice King published
twenty-three trial court opinions as compared to eight opinions by Justice Benson. In Volume
III, Justice King published twenty-eight opinions as compared to ten by Justice Benson.
Although statistics on the docket are not available, this disparity cannot solely be explained by
a greater number of court filings in the areas covered by Justice King since the workload is
divided in a roughly equal allocation. Rather, it appears that Justice King has a greater pro-
pensity to write and publish opinions.
43. See, e.g., Etpison v. Perman, 1 F.S.M. Intrm. 405 (Pon. 1984) (27 pages); FSM v.
Skilling, 1 F.S.M. Intrm. 464 (Kos. 1984) (22 pages); Suldan v. FSM (II), I F.S.M. Intrm. 339
(Pon. 1983) (25 pages).
44. See, e.g., Truk v. Hartman, 1 F.S.M. Intrm. 43 (Truk 1981) (4 pages); Neimes v.
Maeda Construction Co., I F.S.M. Intrm. 47 (Truk 1981) (6 pages).
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role. Justice King's philosophy is evident in a quote from a copious,
early appellate decision he wrote: "[T]o assist in developing the jurispru-
dence of this new nation, we find it appropriate here to discuss at some
length several fundamental aspects of this case."45 One final pattern of
note is that without exception, every significant discussion of custom
thus far has come in opinions written by Justice King.
C. Custom and Tradition
1. Criminal Cases
Initially custom was raised primarily in criminal cases, a circum-
stance which in some respects sets the direction for its extension into
other contexts. The early criminal cases dealing with custom focused not
on the Judicial Guidance Clause, but on several provisions in the crimi-
nal code which specifically address custom. In FSM v. Ruben,46 the de-
fendant Ruben was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon after
he cut his brother-in-law, Terry, with a machete late one night when
Terry came to Ruben's house in an inebriated condition demanding to be
let in. Ruben admitted that under custom he had special obligations to
his brother-in-law, which prohibited him from attacking Terry and
which allowed Terry access to his house, although Ruben denied that
this customary right extended to such late night entries.47 Ruben ten-
dered a plea of guilty "because he believed he had violated custom by
striking his brother-in-law."4" Justice King did not accept the guilty plea
and, following a trial, acquitted Ruben based on the common law defense
of reasonable use of force in the protection of family and household.49
Opposing the acquittal, the government argued that Ruben could
not invoke this common law defense because under customary law he
had no privilege to refuse access to his brother-in-law.50 Justice King
ruled the government had failed to meet the burden of proof imposed by
the following criminal code provision:
(1) Generally accepted customs prevailing within the Federated
45. Alaphonso v. FSM, I F.S.M. Intrm. 209, 211 (App. 1982). Justice King stated on the
record in another case his philosophy about opinions: "The Court's policy is to make its opin-
ions public and to turn over copies of the opinions to the Public Information Officer as part of
the Court's wish to develop a system ofjurisprudence here in the Federated States of Microne-
sia." Skilling v. FSM, 2 F.S.M. Intrm. 209, 215 (App. 1986).
46. FSM v. Ruben, I F.S.M. Intrm. 34, 34-42 (Truk 1981).
47. Id. at 39.
48. Id. at 41.
49. Id. at 41-42.
50. Id. at 39-40.
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States of Micronesia relating to crimes and criminal liability shall be
recognized and considered by the National Courts. Where conflicting
customs are both relevant, the Court shall determine the weight to be
accorded to each;
(2) Unless otherwise made applicable or given legal effect by stat-
ute, the applicability and effect of customary law in a criminal case
arising under this act shall be determined by the Court of jurisdiction
in such criminal case;
(3) Where there is a dispute as to the existence or effect of cus-
tomary law applicable to a criminal case arising under this title, the
party asserting applicability of customary law has the burden of prov-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence the existence, applicability, and
customary effect of such customary law."'
Under the terms of this provision the burden of proof is invoked only
when there is a "dispute." Justice King acknowledged the existence of
the general custom, but found there to be a dispute whether custom al-
lowed the "timing and manner" of Terry's entry.52
The relationship between custom and court proceedings was ad-
dressed more directly in the next case involving custom, FSM v.
Mudong.53 The defendant Mudong was charged with assault. Shortly
thereafter, over a hundred persons from the various families involved
gathered for a duly tendered and accepted traditional apology.5" An affi-
davit from the victim's family states: "[I]t is the consensus of both sides
that bad feeling be put to a stop, and that further prosecution of the
criminal case may hinder that goal.., for that reason, both sides agreed
that request has to be made to the proper authorities to dismiss the
case. . . .,. The prosecutor refused to dismiss the case,56 which
prompted the defendant to file a motion to dismiss with the Court. Jus-
tice King began his analysis by noting that under Trust Territory High
Court cases customary forgiveness could not preclude criminal prosecu-
tion.57 He then acknowledged that "Congress has set aside the previous
51. 11 F.S.M.C. § 108 (1982); FSM v. Ruben, 1 F.S.M. Intrm. 34, 38-40 (Truk 1981).
52. Id.
53. FSM v. Mudong, I F.S.M. Intrm. 135 (Pon. 1982).
54. Id. at 137.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 136. The prosecutor in the case, Fredrick Canavor, was an expatriate
American.
57. Id. at 138. See Trust Territory v. Lone Lino, 6 T.T.R. 7 (Tr. Div. Marshall Is. 1972);
Celis v. Trust Territory, 3 T.T.R. 237 (Tr. Div. Marianas Is. 1967); see also Arnett, supra note
17, at 196 ("Once the offending party was forgiven in accordance with customary practice, it
was as if the offense had never occured. This often caused prosecutors serious difficulties in
that, as far as their complaining witness was concerned and would testify, the offense never
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assumption that customary law must always yield to specific statutory
provisions."" Nevertheless, Justice King concluded that customary set-
tlements do not require the court to dismiss criminal proceedings. In
support of this finding he discussed the common law doctrine of
prosecutorial discretion and expressed reluctance to encroach upon this
discretion. 9 Again, as in Ruben, Justice King ultimately couched his
decision in terms of the failure to meet the burden of proof.
Justice King's phraseology of the required showing is particularly
instructive: "[T]he defendants have offered no evidence to establish that
dismissal of a court proceeding is one of the 'customary' results invaria-
bly flowing from an apology ceremony."' ca Obviously, prior to foreign
contact there were no "court proceedings" or even "crimes" in the West-
ern sense.61 Justice King recognized that a hundred years ago a custom-
ary settlement resolved the matter completely, but pointed out that the
situation changed with time as the Germans and then the Japanese set up
court systems and maintained control over punishment for crimes.62 He
reiterated that under American rule, customary forgiveness had no effect
on court proceedings.6 3 Consequently, he found, "against this back-
ground we may not merely assume today a viable principle of customary
law to the effect that a customary settlement mandates dismissal of crimi-
nal court proceedings."" Justice King relied upon the apparently rea-
sonable proposition that what matters is the effect of customary
forgiveness today, not a hundred years ago. The problem with his nar-
row formulation of the required showing is that by necessity it leads back
to the Trust Territory policy of custom being subservient to written law,
which is the relation between custom and law today precisely because
that is what the Trust Territory allowed for the preceding forty years.
By sleight-of-reason, the Constitutional and statutory effort to raise cus-
happened. However, the [Trust Territory] Court uniformly held that, notwithstanding the
resulting difficulties of proof and the problem of discouraging public cooperation with law
enforcement, custom had to yield to the law.").
58. FSM v. Mudong, I F.S.M. Intrm. 135, 139 (Pon. 1982) (considering Article V of the
Constitution and section 108 of the criminal code).
59. Id. at 140. Justice King cited an FSM case, Nix v. Ehmes, 1 F.S.M. Intrm. 114 (Pon.
1982), in support of the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion. Id. The holding in Nix was based
entirely on United States case law.
60. FSM v. Mudong, 1 F.S.M. Intrm. at 141-42.
61. See Koike v. Ponape Rock Products, 3 F.S.M. Intrm. 57, 70 n.2 (Pon. S. Ct. Tr. 1986)
("Pohnpeians do not distinguish criminal wrong from civil wrong. Both are considered and
looked at as wrongs which ought to be remedied by the wrongdoer, if not avenged.").
62. Mudong, 1 F.S.M. Intrin. at 142-43.
63. Id. at 143, 146-47.
64. Id. at 143.
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tom from its "previous inferior status"65 was vitiated.
Justice King ended the opinion with the conclusion that customary
law and the legal system "serve different purposes."6 6 Customary law
deemphasizes the notion of individual responsibility in favor of group
responsibility.67 Contrasted against this, Justice King posited that the
legal system focuses on individual guilt as a method to preserve order
and respect for the law.68 Perhaps unknowingly, in driving this wedge
between custom and the legal system, Justice King relied upon the
quintessentially Western concept of the separate, legitimate interests of
the state, a notion which fits less readily on small island societies where
until relatively recently there was no "state" entity and where the focus
of social and cultural life was and still is the community. Inexplicably,
there is no mention in the decision of the Judicial Guidance Clause or the
possibility that this Clause effected a merger of custom and legal system
rather than a separation.
Alaphonso v. FSM6 9 is the last opinion in a criminal case to contain
an extended discussion of custom, and the only one to address the Judi-
cial Guidance Clause. Alaphonso was convicted of three counts of as-
sault with a dangerous weapon. He appealed the conviction on the
grounds of insufficiency of evidence.70 Raising the issue sua sponte, Jus-
tice King pointed out that the parties "have merely cited legal authorities
from the United States, including decisions of United States federal and
state courts, without explaining why those authorities are pertinent to
these issues before this Court."71 After a review of the legislative history
of the Judicial Guidance Clause, the court concluded that it is not bound
by such authorities and "must not fall into the error of adopting the rea-
soning of those decisions without independently considering suitability of
that reasoning for the Federated States of Micronesia."72 Following this
65. Id. at 139 ("Customary law is not placed in an exalted or overriding posture under the
Constitution and statutes of the Federated States of Micronesia, but neither is it relegated to its
previous inferior status.").
66. Id. at 144-46.
67. Id. at 144-45 ("Major purposes of customary forgiveness are to prevent further vio-
lence and conflict, to soothe wounded feelings, and to ease the intense emotions of those most
directly involved so that they can go about their lives in relative harmony.").
68. Id. at 145 ("The view of the constitutional legal system is to be toward and from all of
society, not just the communities of the defendants and the victims.").
69. Alaphonso v. FSM, I F.S.M. Intrm. 209 (App. 1982).
70. Id. at 210.
71. Id. at 212. This observation by the Court undoubtedly surprised counsel in the case.
It had long been standard practice in the FSM, carried over from the Trust Territory Courts,
for counsel as well as the FSM Court to rely almost exclusively on American cases.
72. Id. at 213.
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assertion of independence, the Court noted the similarity between the
due process clause of the FSM Constitution and the United States Con-
stitution, discussed the leading United States Supreme Court cases inter-
preting the due process clause, and adopted for the FSM the American
interpretation of the due process clause existing at the time of the Micro-
nesian Constitutional Convention.73 The theory behind the Court's anal-
ysis is that the drafters knew how the words they borrowed were
interpreted and applied and by use of the same language they endorsed
the prevailing interpretation. Consideration of the local applicability of
this case law was summarized by a statement of the Court's confidence
that, no different than Americans in this regard, Micronesians "wish to
safeguard citizens from dubious and unjust convictions."'74
73. Id. at 214-23 (discussing at length In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), as well as other
leading cases). Legislative history to the Declaration of Rights mentions decisions of United
States courts interpreting similar provisions. See Standing Committee Report No. 23, in 2
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 16, at 793-804; see also Tosie v. Tosie, 1 F.S.M.
Intrm. 149, 153-54 (Kos. 1982). However, none of the delegates were legal experts and it is
nothing less than a fiction to believe they had more than a general understanding of the terms
and phrases they borrowed from the United States Constitution. Certainly their knowledge of
the case law for the most part did not extend past the case citations in the Committee reports.
See N. MELLER, supra note 5, at 196 ("But there was a problem beyond interpretation or
minimizing the use of 'legalism,' for all of the English terminology employed was technical in
the sense that it depended upon a warp and woof of historical concept and legal experience
with which few of the delegates were adequately conversant, regardless of their English-speak-
ing abilities."). Anticipating what a later court might wrongly infer, as Justice King in fact
did, delegates who feared adoption of American -law gave notice that they would "make a
motion to strike from all records of this Convention all reference to U.S. common law." Id. at
210 n.7. The motion did not come about, but their prescient fears have been confirmed.
74. Alaphonso v. FSM, 1 F.S.M. Intrm. 209, 221 (App. 1982). Following is the court's
full discussion of this issue:
It may conceivably be argued that in island society the risk of 'dubious and
unjust conviction' [quoting Winship] is diminished so that the reasonable doubt stan-
dard becomes unnecessary. The theory would be that, since so many people on an
island know each other, everybody 'knows' who is guilty and who is not. However,
there is no reason to believe that people of islands are more immune from rumors,
prejudice, mob action and hysteria than are people who live on other geographical
configurations. Indeed, we have all seen examples of 'truths' rapidly accepted in
small communities, later rejected as incorrect and unfounded. It appears that the
need for a reasonable doubt standard is at least as great here as in other societies.
We nevertheless believe that the people of the Federated States of Micronesia
will hold greater respect for their criminal justice system if it proceeds cautiously and
respects the liberty of individual Micronesian citizens rather than responds to the
tensions and passions of the moment and sacrifices individuals to the expectations of
an inflamed community.
Id. at 221-22. It is difficult to quarrel with these observations. However, they tend to conceal
that the choice is one of degree-whether the "preponderance of the evidence" or the "beyond
a reasonable doubt" standard is appropriate to Micronesia. Presumably either standard would
guard against the passions of the community and dubious convictions, the difference being
only the acceptable margin of error.
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Alaphonso has had a major impact beyond the criminal arena and is
one of the most often cited cases in later FSM Supreme Court decisions.
The significance of this case lies less in its specific holding than in the
mechanical litany it devised, which subsequently has been followed time
and again: FSM Court is independent; language of law is similar to
United States law; review United States case law; rationale is applicable
to FSM; adopt American interpretation for FSM.7 5 Since almost all of
the existing laws in the FSM, including the Constitution, were modeled
after American counterparts, or taken directly from former Trust Terri-
tory laws which were themselves modeled upon American laws, the end
result is the wholesale adoption of American case law for the FSM.76
Together, Ruben, Mudong, and Alaphonso form the core case law
for treatment of custom in criminal cases. Although these cases were
essentially treated the same, each involved a conceptually distinct appli-
cation of custom. Ruben considered the effect of custom on an element
or defense to a specific crime-what is or is not illegal. Mudong consid-
ered the effect of custom on whether charges should be brought-institu-
tional roles and the administration of justice. Alaphonso considered the
standard of proof for conviction-the protection of individuals from the
exercise of government power. They all share the feature that the Court
by its words paid homage to custom, while by its actions and in outcome
the law continued to defer to American standards. Up to the present, the
argument that custom should be used to modify the usual United States
statutory or case law has not prevailed in any reported criminal case.
Most often, the effort to invoke custom is rebuffed by the Court on the
grounds that the proponent did not meet the narrowly formulated bur-
den of proof of showing the existence or effect of the custom at issue.77
75. See, e.g., Falcam v. FSM, 3 F.S.M. Intrm. 112 (Pon. 1987) (accept common law);
Rauzi v. FSM, 2 F.S.M. Intrm. 8 (Pon. 1985) (court not bound, will follow common law of
taxation); FSM v. George, 1 F.S.M. Intrm. 449 (Kos. 1984) (court not bound, will accept
United States Fourth Amendment case law).
76. See, e.g., FSM v. Jonathan, 2 F.S.M. Intrm. 189 (Kos. 1986) (adopt United States law
on protection against self-incrimination); Ponape Transfer & Storage v. Pohnpei State Pub.
Lands Authority, 2 F.S.M. Intrm. 272 (Pon. 1986) (rules of procedure same, adopt United
States law on issuance of injunctions); Semens v. Continental Air Lines, 2 F.S.M. Intrm. 131
(Pon. 1985) (common law on contract and tort); Ponape Chamber of Commerce v. Nett, 1
F.S.M. Intrm. 389, 393 n. 1 (Pon. 1984) (same meaning of "cases" for jurisdiction); Engichy v.
FSM, 1 F.S.M. Intrm. 532, 545 (App. 1984) (adopt Glasser standard of review, review evi-
dence in light most favorable to court findings of fact); Suldan v. FSM (II), 1 F.S.M. Intrm.
339 (Pon. 1983) (similarity of constitutional scheme to find power of judicial review).
77. See, e.g., Teruo v. FSM, 2 F.S.M. Intrm. 167 (App. 1986); FSM v. Raitoun, 1 F.S.M.
Intrm. 589 (Truk 1984). A case recognizing the status of traditional leaders, In re Iriarte (II),
1 F.S.M. Intrm. 255 (Pon. 1983), concluded that the law must not demean this status, but
otherwise the traditional leader was to be treated like any other defendant. Id. at 15-17.
[Vol. 13
Indigenous Jurisprudence in Micronesia
2. Civil Cases
This pattern of treatment of custom in criminal cases can also be
found in a more refined form in the context of civil cases. Civil cases
were not affected by the statutory provision in the criminal code specifi-
cally addressing custom, so the Court more directly confronted the im-
pact of the Judicial Guidance clause. Semens v. Continental Air Lines,
Inc.,7 contains the most in depth examination of the background and
meaning of this clause. The case involved a basic contract and personal
injury action, and the issue was whether common law doctrines would
apply. Again sua sponte, Justice King raised the impact of custom under
the Judicial Guidance Clause.79 The case was decided in 1985, approxi-
mately four years after the Court officially began to function, and still the
meaning of the Judicial Guidance Clause had not been clarified.
Following an extensive recitation of the legislative history, Justice
King concluded that in disputes involving contracts or negligence, the
Judicial Guidance Clause imposed the following "requirements on the
Court's analytical method:"
First, in the unlikely event that a constitutional provision bears upon
the case, that provision would prevail over any other source of law.
Second, any applicable Micronesian custom or tradition would be con-
sidered and the Court's decision must be consistent therewith. If there
is no directly applicable constitutional provision, custom or tradition,
or if those sources are insufficient to resolve all issues in the case, then
the Court may look to the law of other nations. Any approach drawn
from those other sources, however, must be consistent with the letter
and spirit of the Constitution as well as principles of, and values inher-
ent in, Micronesian custom and tradition. 80
Justice King set out a descending order of inquiry which appears to place
custom in a hallowed position just below the Constitution, and which
sets the test of legitimacy to be consistency with the "principles" and
"values" underlying the customs rather than the specific customs them-
selves. This enlightened approach at last seemed to give custom its due.
78. Semens v. Continental Air Lines, 2 F.S.M. Intrm. 131 (Pon. 1985).
79. Id. at 137-42. He concluded that the Judicial Guidance Clause placed an affirmative
obligation on the Court to consider custom and tradition regardless of whether the issue was
raised by the parties. Id. at 139-40 (citing Alaphonso v. FSM, 1 F.S.M. Intrm. 209, 213 (App.
1982)).
80. Id See also Rauzi v. FSM, 2 F.S.M. Intrm. 8, 14 (Pon. 1985) ("The constitutional
[Judicial Guidance Clause] provision identifies as our guiding star, not the Restatement or
decisions of United States courts concerning the common law, but the fundamental principle
that our decisions must be 'consistent' with the 'Constitution, Micronesian customs and tradi-
tion, and the social and geographical configuration of Micronesia.' ").
1989]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
However, by situating custom in this hierarchy, designating it as a
separate source of law, he in effect insured that custom would be dis-
missed with a nod, as he then proceeded to do when applying this analyt-
ical method:
The business activities which gave rise to this lawsuit are not of a
local or traditional nature. While there may have been a traditional
arrangement whereby one party agreed to handle or move goods for
another, the setting and items handled by the parties to this arrange-
ment are of a markedly nonlocal, international character ....
The contract reveals no intention that Micronesian custom or tra-
dition was to serve as the guide for interpretation of the indemnifica-
tion clause. The ground handling agreement makes no reference to
custom or tradition. The agreement is written in English only, not in
Pohnpeian or any other language indigenous to Micronesia.
Based upon these factors, I conclude that there is no applicable
Micronesian custom or tradition. Analysis may proceed to legal prin-
cipies developed elsewhere.81
By defining the search for applicable custom in so specific a fashion, he
dictated that the outcome of the search would be failure. Not surpris-
ingly, Justice King concluded that United States common law was an
appropriate source to resolve contract and tort issues. He simply de-
clared that "all the [United States] common law grounds referred to...
are consistent with Micronesian values and therefore should be
adopted.... " 2 There was no mention of what these Micronesian values
are or how he had identified them, or what relation they had with
custom.
Once devised, this mode of narrowly specific inquiry was wielded
without remorse in case after case to dismiss any possible application of
custom. For example, in subsequent cases the Court found no evidence
that custom had application to the conduct of judicial sales,8 3 to the sta-
tus of wage claims in employer insolvency proceedings, 4 to an agree-
ment between the National Government and operators of a United States
owned fishing vessel in an attempt to terminate court proceedings,8 5 to
the abuse of process tort or to whether a non-FSM citizen may engage in
business within the FSM.86 It appears as if this technique of juxtaposing
81. Semens, 2 F.S.M. Intrm. at 140-41.
82. Id. at 147.
83. Sets v. Island Hardware, 3 F.S.M. Intrm. 365, 367 (Pon. 1988).
84. In re Mid-Pacific Construction Co., 3 F.S.M. Intrm. 292, 300 (Pon. 1988).
85. FSM v. Ocean Pearl, 3 F.S.M. Intrm. 87, 91 (Pon. 1987).
86. Mailo v. Twum-Barimah, 2 F.S.M. Intrm. 265, 268 (Pon. 1986).
[V/ol. 13
Indigenous Jurisprudence in Micronesia
the term custom with these evidently modem situations and concepts
was intended to patently show the irrelevance of custom, obviating the
need for further discussion. A number of the opinions explicitly declared
custom inapplicable because the circumstance at issue "historically" did
not exist.8 7 In all cases the result was the same: custom and tradition
had absolutely no impact on the law.
Panuelo v. Pohnpei, 8 issued by Justice King soon after Semens, is
unique in that it actually considered custom beyond a cursory dismissal.
The issue was whether the State of Pohnpei was entitled to invoke the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Although neither party had suggested
that custom and tradition might apply, Justice King, citing Semens,
ruled he had an affirmative obligation to consider the issue.8 9 Justice
King took judicial notice of several historical and anthropological ac-
counts of the conduct of Ponapean Kings.9" There were, and still are,
two types of traditional leaders-Nahnmwarki and Nahniken-who
were obliged to "help the people."91 "Even with their great powers,
Nahnmwarkis are required by custom to respond to a commoner seeking
a hearing through the intercession of a Nahniken for the purposes of
obtaining forgiveness." 92 Justice King found no evidence of what he con-
sidered the "more pertinent issue" of whether the traditional leaders
were required to hear complaints that the leaders themselves had harmed
others.93 In the absence of information bearing on this issue, he found
the evidence inconclusive. Nevertheless, he continued: "It is apparent
however that substantial responsiveness of leaders is crucial to the tradi-
tional system. Considerations of custom and tradition then may be seen
as pointing away from sovereign immunity." 94 He ultimately found the
state did not have sovereign immunity on a standard common law and
statutory law analysis.
The extraordinary aspect of the analysis in this case is that Justice
King saw fit to consider the application of custom through analogy,
87. See, eg., Ocean Pearl, 3 F.S.M. Intrm. at 91; Mailo, 2 F.S.M. Intrm. at 268.
88. Panuelo v. Pohnpei, 2 F.S.M. Intrm. 150 (Pon. 1986).
89. Id. at 159.
90. Id. at 160 n.9.
91. Id. at 160.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 161. It is not clear why Justice King simply did not order a separate inquiry to
resolve this issue, as undoubtedly current traditional leaders could have provided him with a
definitive answer. A mechanism to provide such answers is provided by the Judiciary Act of
1979, which allows for the appointment of "assessors" to advise the court on issues involving
custom. 4 F.S.M.C. § 113 (1982). Although assessors have been appointed, the Court has yet
to take testimony from them in a case. See Turcott, supia note 25, at 366-67.
94. Panuelo v. Pohnpei, 2 F.S.M. Intrm. 150, 161 (Pon. 1986).
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rather than the usual strict inquiry. To even conceive that a custom re-
quiring traditional leaders to listen to the complaints about their conduct
has any application to the doctrine of sovereign immunity is to bravely
(or blindly) leap across a vast chasm of logic and law. No other case
before or after Panuelo considers custom through analogy.
D. Social and Geographical Configuration
The Court's consideration of "social and geographical" differences
pursuant to the Judicial Guidance Clause has differed little from its treat-
ment of custom. In FSM v. Mark9 5 the Court examined whether a
search warrant was needed to conduct a plain view search. Justice King
observed that in Micronesia, which consists of many small islands scat-
tered over great distances with limited means of transportation, few po-
lice officers, and even fewer judges, the obstacles to obtaining a warrant
dictate that the same standards applied in the United States for search
warrants are appropriate, but no higher or additional burdens should be
imposed.96 Accordingly, Justice King adopted the American "plain
view" exception to the search warrant requirement.97
In FSM v. Edward 98 Justice King considered the waiver of a right to
counsel. Although he adopted the same standards as those used in
United States case law, he recognized that many people in Micronesia do
not fully understand their right to counsel, and therefore suggested that
courts should "indulge in every reasonable presumption against finding a
waiver." 99
In Bukea v. FSM " the defendant argued that cultural differences
required a rule of corroboration in victim testimony rape cases. Defense
counsel contended that different actions and values concerning sexuality
might result in an American trial judge or even a Micronesian judge from
a different area misinterpreting the actions or words. °1 The Court de-
clined to adopt a rule of corroboration, holding only that these "legiti-
mate concerns" should remind the judge to proceed with "even greater
care and thoroughness than might be necessary elsewhere."' 02
The only situation in which social and geographical considerations
95. FSM v. Mark, 1 F.S.M. Intrm. 284 (Pon. 1983).
96. Id. at 293-97.
97. Id. at 295.
98. FSM v. Edward, 3 F.S.M. Intrm. 224 (Pon. 1987).
99. Id. at 236. For the proposition of indulging in every reasonable presumption, Justice
King cites Johnson v. Zerbst, 308 U.S. 458 (1938). Edward, 3 F.S.M. Intrm. at 234-36.
100. Buekea v. FSM, I F.S.M. Intrm. 487 (App. 1984).
101. Id. at 490-91.
102. Id. at 491-92.
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did affect the outcome of a decision relates to recovery of attorney's
costs. In Ray v. Electrical Contracting Corp. et. al. 103 the Court deter-
mined that the fact that there were no on-island attorneys who could
represent the plaintiff came within the purview of the social and geo-
graphical phrase of the Judicial Guidance Clause. Thus, the plaintiff was
allowed to recover attorney travel expenses as a "cost" under the statute,
regardless of the bulk of U.S. law holding otherwise. 1°4
Aside from Ray, of all the cases that cite the Judicial Guidance
Clause, in only two did the Court clearly depart from the United States
common law. In Aisek v. Foreign Investment Board105 after noting that
American commentators had mounted "legitimate arguments" against
the nexus requirement for standing, Justice King declined to adopt it for
the FSM. 1°6 In Luda v. Maeda Road Construction Co. Ltd. 107 Justice
King refused to follow the existing common law rule on the tolling of
statute of limitations in wrongful death actions. He would not accept the
existing "restrictive and crabbed method of interpretation," and instead
relied upon policy considerations.108 Despite the fact that he exercised
the freedom from strict adherence to common law provided to the court
by the Judicial Guidance Clause, in neither case did Justice King cite any
reason for the departure relating to custom and tradition or the social
and geographical configuration of Micronesia. Rather, he simply dis-
agreed with the prevailing law.
E. Findings
The foregoing review of FSM Supreme Court opinions confirms that
the Judicial Guidance Clause has not been applied in the fashion desired
by the drafters of the Constitution. Indeed, it appears that the worst
fears of the drafters-that the court would strictly adhere to United
States case law-has become a reality. This outcome has to some extent
been obscured by the language of the opinions, which time and again
celebrates the special position of custom and tradition under the Consti-
tution. Only after stripping away this gloss does it become obvious that
there has been no real change from previous Trust Territory High Court
practices which the Micronesians abhorred and from which they point-
edly tried to get away. A substantial body of case law has now been
103. Ray v. Electrical Contracting Corp., 2 F.S.M. Intrm. 21 (App. 1985).
104. Id. at 25-26.
105. Aisek v. Foreign Investment Board, 2 F.S.M. Intrm. 95 (Pon. 1985).
106. Id. at 102.
107. Luda v. Maeda Road Construction Co., 2 F.S.M. Intrm. 107 (Pon. 1985).
108. Id. at 111-13.
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developed by the FSM Supreme Court and recent decisions cite more
and more to FSM case law rather than case law from the United States.
This practice merely furthers the illusion that the FSM has developed its
own indigenous body of law. Even worse, this practice cements the law
for future generations in a way that the Trust Territory High Court
could not.
At the outset there must be a clearer delineation of the meaning of
custom and tradition under the Judicial Guidance Clause. Thus far, a
mass of applications have been mixed together without distinction. The
opinions use the terms custom, customary law, and tradition inter-
changeably. Sometimes custom is looked at as law, at other times as
background fact. Custom has alternately been treated in its historical
form and in its current manifestation. Customs have been reviewed on
the level of establishing or negating rights and obligations, as well as on
the more general systemic or institutional level. Custom is used in its
actual form or through analogy. Sometimes evidence of custom must be
introduced. At other times the existence of a custom is implicitly as-
sumed or judicial notice is taken.
Blame for the failure to develop a body of indigenous jurisprudence
cannot fairly be placed upon the Court. The Court has conscientiously
struggled with a complex, baffling, perhaps impossible task. Although
the delegates to the Constitutional Convention were clear on what they
did not want, they were much more vague about what they did want and
how it could be accomplished. Even among Micronesians there is no
consensus on precisely what role custom should assume in their legal
system. There is also a substantial question whether the merging of cus-
tom with a Western legal system and concepts can even be done. For
example, it is not readily apparent what, if any, relationship custom has
with a proceeding in bankruptcy or the rights of a corporation. Further
complications are created by the fact that as the new nation continues to
grow, its external economic and political contacts will increase, which
would seem to require that its laws conform to basic, generally accepted
standards, at least in business matters.
F. State Courts on Custom
Each of the four Micronesian states presently has functioning state
court systems in various stages of development. These court systems are
modeled after that of the FSM Supreme Court. All of the state court
judges are indigenous, only one has a law degree; most have had training
in the American common law style through a series of seminars con-
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ducted by faculty members of the University of Hawaii Law School.1 09
The states also have municipal courts designed to be informal and to deal
with matters on the village level, although these courts are largely inac-
tive and are not currently a significant factor. 110
Presently there are just a few written state court opinions, all of
which have been published since December 1985."l In form, the deci-
sions are indistinguishable from traditional common law style opinions,
with statements of the facts and issues and an analysis which includes
reliance upon case law or statutes or other authoritative sources as the
basis for rulings. For the most part, when local statutes do not apply, the
opinions cite to precedent from the United States and from the FSM
Supreme Court on issues of substantive law. Considering the limited
legal training of the judges, their mastery of the American legal style is
remarkable.
Despite this overall pattern, decisions of the State Court of Pohnpei
have occasionally utilized custom as a basis for rulings. In Hadley v.
Board of Trustees,"2 the Court denied a motion for a default judgment
for failure to file a responsive pleading on the basis that the adversary
system, "which was introduced to Micronesia and became, without our
consciousness, the system in Micronesia," ' 3 is too harsh and rigid. The
Court cautioned that it "must always ensure such application [of the
Rules of Procedure] be given a fair reconciliation with local customary
practices ... so that the Pohnpeian concept of justice does not uncon-
sciously fade away.""' 4
A maxim of customary law was directly applied by the Pohnpei
State Court in Phillip v. Aldis 5 to determine the amount of damages in a
109. See Bowman, Judicial Seminars in Micronesia, 9 U. HAW. L. REv. 533 (1987). A
recent nominee to the Yap State Court, Martin Yinug, has a law degree from Catholic Univer-
sity in Washington, D.C.
110. See, e.g., Tamanaha, supra note 14, at 96 n. 106. Municipal court judges in Yap are
traditional leaders. There are ten municipalities, but only three have court systems and just a
few cases-all dealing with land-have been handled.
111. The third volume of the F.S.M. Interim Reporter began to include state court opin-
ions. To date there have been 11 opinions from Kosrae (5 of these opinions were written by
Justice King sitting as a temporary state judge); 13 opinions from Pohnpei; 1 opinion from
Yap; and 7 opinions from Truk.
112. Hadley v. Board of Trustees, 3 F.S.M. Intrm. 14 (Pon. S. Ct. Tr. 1985).
113. Id. at 16 ("Inasmuch as Pohnpei has its own traditional means of dispute resolution
... it is an opportune time for Pohnpei to make necessary corrections in our legal system and
to set the course in the development of our legal system in a more acceptable order, so that our
citizens, now and in the future, will not regret too harshly the course we chose to follow under
the authority of our Constitutional Government.").
114. Id.
115. Phillip v. Aldis, 3 F.S.M. Intrm. 33 (Pon. S. Ct. Tr. 1987).
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case involving an accident to a rental car:
Plaintiff's failure to repossess the vehicle when he ought to and his
acceding to defendant's continued possession and use (realizing that
wear and tear would normally occur) made him guilty of what is
known in Pohnpeian custom as: KE PWURONG OMW MWUR,
meaning you reap the fruit of your misdeed. Application of customary
law takes precedence over the common law, Pon. Const. art. 5, section
1 . . . and I think the act of the plaintiff, under the circumstances,
warrants enunciation of the custom herein described.1 16
The opinion is especially notable because of its effortless blend of com-
mon law and customary law. The Court first cited United States case
law on contract doctrine to find the defendant liable, then it applied cus-
tomary law to reduce the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff." 7
The Pohnpei court similarly blended customary law and the com-
mon law of tort in Koike v. Ponape Rock Products, Inc. 1 8 Relying pri-
marily on Prosser's hornbook, the Court set out the law of negligence,
then extensively described Pohnpeian custom on civil wrongs. 9 These
two sources were described in a way which showed their overlap. Com-
mon law was used as a "guide" for decisionmaking except where custom
dictated a different outcome. 120 The Court's holding is stated in a fash-
116. Id. at 38.
117. Id. at 37-38 (citing cases from state courts in Kansas and Washington, as well as the
U.S. Supreme Court).
118. Koike v. Ponape Rock Products, 3 F.S.M. Intrm. 57 (Pon. S. Ct. Tr. 1986).
119. Id. at 70-71. The custom was described as follows:
When the injury sustained is on the body of a person (personal injury), the person
causing the injury must undertake certain undertakings which include, first an apol-
ogy to the injured person and his family to ease the tension, and second the provision
of specialized assistance to heal the injury or stop the pain sustained by the injured
person or by his family. The third is the provision of material assistance to the in-
jured person to assist in the sustenance of his livelihood as he would be expected to
provide for himself and for his family had he not been injured. Some people even
provide land to the injured person as a remedy for the injury. There is no specific
length of time for which the provision of such remedial assistance should continue.
The impact of the injury attaches an everlasting obligation on the part of the tort-
feasor to provide support for the injured person.
When the injury however results in the death of a person, the form of remedy
may extend to making the person who caused the killing take the place of the de-
ceased person in his family and provide all the services expected of the deceased. But
when one undertakes to negotiate for the remedy of exchanging the person who did
the killing for the deceased, one must be very careful for there is a danger inherent in
the situation that the receiving family may be very receptive to the bargained ex-
change mainly for the purposes of revenge, and if revenge is successful a family feud
is sure to continue and social unrest will follow as the clansmen join the feud.
Id. at 70-71.
120. Id. at 70-75.
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ion that rests equally on customary law and common law in finding lia-
bility for negligence; the Court departed from common law in favor of
custom once to reject the collateral source rule.121
Two aspects of the Pohnpeian Court's application of custom in the
above cases are in sharp contrast to the FSM Supreme Court. First, the
Court did not require the existence of the custom it applied in each case
to be established as a matter of proof.1 22 Nor was there a question of
how the custom applied. The Court simply asserted the existence of the
custom in the form of a general norm or social practice, presumably
drawn from the judge's knowledge as a participant in the culture, and
applied the norm to the issues in the case. Second, the Court unhesi-
tantly applied the customary norms to modem situations-a rental car
agreement, an accident at a construction site, and the court rules of pro-
cedure. These marked differences in approach exist notwithstanding the
fact that the Pohnpei court views the relationship between custom and
law in essentially the same manner as that espoused by the FSM Supreme
Court. 123
Whether these cases presage a trend toward greater application of
custom is difficult to predict. All three of the decisions were the product
of one man, Chief Justice Edwel H. Santos of the Pohnpei Supreme
Court, and no similar decision has been issued in almost two years. 24
Several factors cohere to inhibit further inroads in the use of custom. All
of the states have adopted constitutions, laws, and judicial institutions
modeled after those of the United States for reasons similar to those on
the national level, although each preserves a special role for custom. 125
The overwhelming weight of these borrowed laws and institutions pro-
121. The court declined to follow the collateral source rule for damages because the pur-
pose behind giving to the victim is different in Pohnpeian society: "Moreover any member of
the wrongdoer's family may come to the aid of the wrongdoer to contribute to the damages
resulting from the negligent conduct of the wrongdoer to his victim. The Court ought to
consider that kind of collateral source of payment in assessing damages, otherwise Pohnpeian
social and family ties will dissipate." Id. at 74.
122. The State Court of Kosrae took the opposite approach due to requirement imposed by
statute: "It should be noted that both counsel failed to introduce evidence of customary or
traditional law. Pursuant to KC 6.303, the court cannot consider tradition unless satisfactory
evidence of it is introduced." Melander v. Kosrae, 3 F.S.M. Intrm. 324, 326 n. 1 (Kos. S. Ct.
Tr. 1988).
123. See Koike v. Ponape Rock Products, 3 F.S.M. Intrm. 57, 64 (Pon. S. Ct. Tr. 1986)
("These constitutional provisions aim at substituting Pohnpeian (Micronesian) customs and
concepts of justice as the source of law when and where there is no statute regulating or
governing a given subject matter.").
124. Phillip v. Aldis, 3 F.S.M. Intrm. 33 (Pon. S. Ct. Tr. 1987), the latest of the three
opinions, was issued on April 27, 1987.
125. See Tamanaha, supra note 14, at 98-100.
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vides ready-made, easy-to-find solutions which render custom an exter-
nal entity that does not easily fit.
III. Comparable Situations
The situation now faced by the Federated States of Micronesia is
common in colonial and post colonial areas throughout Africa, Asia, and
the Pacific.126 A plethora of anthropological studies have examined the
continuing consequences of the imposition of Western legal systems on
pre-state societies. Without fail, this colonial legacy has resulted in seem-
ingly intractable problems, which, despite the diverse variation of cul-
tures and historical conditions involved, fall into discernible patterns.
This Part of the Article will first describe the underlying nature of these
problems, followed by a specific look at the meaning of custom and cus-
tomary law, concluding with a description of the extant strategies
adopted to address the situation and the flaws in those strategies.
A. Consequences of Imposition of External Law
For indigenous people, externally imposed law is not their own.
This tautological statement is offered as a starting point for the many
implications which flow from it. Jurisprudential scholars of the West
have long believed that law is intimately tied to the culture and customs
of the people it governs. Blackstone, and subsequently Maitland, as-
serted that the common law of England was derived from custom.'2 7
Austin also believed that custom, which he defined as rules of conduct
observed spontaneously by the governed, was a source of law that be-
came positive law upon adoption by the courts and enforcement by the
power of the state.'28 Regardless of whether one believes that the law
consists of a unified system of organized principles, or is developed by the
incremental aggregation of judicial decisions over time, or even accepts
the Marxist conception of law as derived from the economic base, there is
126. The phrase "legal pluralism" was used in M. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS (1975), to describe the situation
where state law in some way recognizes customary law. Id. at 1-4. The term also applies in
situations other than colonial relationship, as in the incorporation of Indian law in North
America and Aboriginal law in Australia. See generally INDIGENOUS LAW AND THE STATE
(B. Morse & G. Woodman eds. 1987). Legal pluralism is now used by social anthropologists
to describe the broader situation of competing "law generating" systems which operate in all
societies. See Griffiths, W'hat is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1986).
127. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 67-68 (1778); 1
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 183 (2d ed. 1898) ("The unenacted
part-and this is the great bulk-of the law seems to be custom (consuetufo).").
128. 1 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 101-02 (5th ed. 1885); 2 Id. at 540-43.
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no question but that ordinarily the law reflects and matches the society to
which it is attached. As anthropologist Leopold Pospisil stated: "In
view of the recognition of the law's dependence upon the rest of the cul-
ture in which it exists, it amounts almost to folly to think that a legal
system of one nation can be easily transplanted into another culture and
applied to another society."' 129
"Imposition thus implies, first, an attempt to induce fundamental
change; second, the application of norms that are external to society;
and third, an absence of democratic consensus from that society."' 130
Due to the alien nature of the imposed system, a divergence occurs be-
tween the normative base of the indigenous culture and that of the
law,131 resulting in a clash of values. 132 Moreover, the sudden nature of
the transplantation dislocates preexisting mechanisms of social order.
These mechanisms of order do not evaporate.'33 They are irrevocably
altered but continue to function in the form of a vigorous "sublegal"
system that exists in a dialectic relationship in the shadow of, influencing
and influenced by, the imposed system.13 4 These factors interact in a
129. L. PosPIsIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW 130 (1971).
130. Okoth-Ogendo, The Imposition of Property Law in Kenya, in THE IMPOSITION OF
LAW 147, 147 (S. Burman & B. Harrell-Bond eds. 1979).
131. Pospisil relies upon this divergence to distinguish the terms customary law and au-
thoritative law:
By customary law, then, will be meant a law that is internalized by a social
group. A law is internalized when the majority of the group considers it to be bind-
ing, as when it stands for the only proper behavior in a given situation....
Authoritarian law, on the other hand, is not internalized by a majority of the
members of a group. A strong minority which supports the legal authority has ele-
vated the law as an "ideal" and may have simply forced the rest of the people to
accept it.
L. POSPISIL, supra note 129, at 194-96. This distinction also serves as a good description of the
imposed law situation.
132. See Pospisil, Legally Induced Culture Change in New Guinea, in THE IMPOSITION OF
LAW, supra note 130, at 127, 140; Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 130, at 165 ("It has been shown
that the first reactions to this imposition generated disruptive conflict throughout the
society.").
133. One reason these "sublegal" systems survive is the inability of the government which
supports the legal system to effectively exert control over rural areas where many people live.
See Weisbrot, Papua New Guinea's Indigenous Jurisprudence and the Legacy of Colonialism,
10 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 39 (1988). An even more basic reason is that in any society "law and
legal institutions can only effect a degree of control of society, greater at some times and less at
others, or more with regard to some matters than others." S. MOORE, LAW As PROcEss 2
(1978).
134. See Galanter, Justice In Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law,
19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981). Drawing upon Moore's semi-autonomous social fields,
Galanter argues that "indigenous law" also thrives in our own society, which has a complex,
multicentric legal order. Id. at 19-20. In this Article, the intent is a more distinctly dualistic
notion of legal and indigenous sublegal, within which ordering by the semi-autonomous social
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countervailing way. The foreignness of the imposed system renders the
sublegal system more comfortable and attractive to indigenous people, 135
while at the same time the very existence of an alternative weakens the
sublegal system and alters the underlying balance of power. 1 36 A certain
degree of assimilation occurs. The sublegal absorbs aspects of the legal
and the legal becomes more indigenous to a point that stops rather short
of complete merger. 137 Even after a lengthy period, including independ-
ent self-rule, indigenous people often continue to identify with the suble-
gal system and the transplanted system never completely loses its alien
feel. At once they coexist symbiotically, yet in conflict.
The most often identified, fundamental difference between systems is
the orientation of Western law toward the individual in contrast to the
collective orientation of pre-state societies. 138 A manifestation of these
fields continue to operate. See Chiba, Conclusion to ASIAN INDIGENOUS LAW IN INTERAC-
TION WITH RECEIVED LAW 378, 386 (M. Chiba ed. 1986) ("The given definition of unofficial
law was 'the legal system not officially sanctioned by any legal authority, but sanctioned in
practice by the general practice of a certain circle of people, whether within or beyond the
bounds of a country' functioning with a 'distinct influence upon the effectiveness of official law;
in other words, those which distinctively supplement, oppose, modify, or undermine any of the
official laws, including state law.' ").
135. See H. RANDA, PROBLEMS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN ENGLISH IMPOSED SYSTEM
OF LAW AND Luo CUSTOMARY LAW IN KENYA 182 (1987) ("The consequences of legal
imposition in Kenya as in other colonial states of Africa imply that the indigenous people in
the rural areas resorted to old traditional rules of settling disputes between their members.");
see also Huber, A Note on Village Courts in Papua New Guinea, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 161,
162 (1981) (people alienated from court.) ("[T]he unofficial traditional machinery of social
control is apparently still working, though to a lesser extent than before.").
136. See J.S. FURNIVALL, COLONIAL POLICY AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF BURMA AND NETHERLANDS INDIA 295 (1948) ("In either case one result is the encourage-
ment of disputes and litigation, because people can appeal against the custom that [they] all
know to the law which no one knows. Law encroaches upon custom, and the decay of custom
encourages the resort to litigation."); Abel, Western Courts in Non- Western Settings: Patterns
of Court Use in Colonial and Neo-Colonial Africa, in THE IMPOSITION OF LAW, supra note
130, at 167, 196 ("[T]he mere availability of modem courts seems to undermine tribal dispute
processing elsewhere in the society."); von Brenda-Beckman, Some Comparative Generaliza-
tions About the Differential Use of State and Folk Institutions of Dispute Settlement, in PEO-
PLE'S LAW AND STATE LAW: THE BELLAGIO PAPERS 187, 192-94 (A. Allott & G. Woodman
eds. 1985) [hereinafter.BELLAGIO PAPERS].
137. See Griffiths, Four Laws of Interaction in Circumstances of Legal Pluralism: First
Steps Towards an Explanatory Theory, in BELLAGIO PAPERS, supra note 136, at 217, 224
("[W]hen two litigation institutions are competing for the same business, there is a tendency
for the substantive law they apply to converge."); see also Chiba, The Channel of Official Law
to Unofficial Law in Japan, in BELLAGIO PAPERS; supra note 136, at 208, 210-12 (legal system
becomes more indigenous); Yngvesson, Re-Examining Continuing Relations and the Law, 85
WiS. L. REV. 623, 628-32 (1985) (mutual adaptation of systems).
138. See Dinnen, Sentencing, Custom and the Rule of Law in Papua New Guinea, 27 J.
LEGAL PLURALISM 19, 40-41 (1988); Schott, Introduction: Chairman's Report, in BELLAGIO
PAPERS, supra note 136, at 75-76; Weisbrot, supra note 133, at 43. Another significant differ-
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alternative orientations is the emphasis on adjudication and application
of the law in Western courts, as opposed to the emphasis on reconcilia-
tion and dispute settling in indigenous systems.' 39 "One basic reason for
this difference is that the primitive law operates without the overriding
sanction of central political institutions, and accordingly requires consen-
sus and support among members of the corporate groups it affects."'"'
An equally basic reason is that in small scale societies where exit is not a
viable option, people live together in continuing relationships; therefore,
disputes must be resolved in a manner that brings peace through
acceptance.
In addition to the previously described consequences of the clash,
three major negative implications flow directly from the fact of trans-
plantation: the inapplicability of the usual assumption that members of a
society are aware of its laws; the substantial gap between the espoused
law and social reality, both in relation to behavior and ideology; and the
law loses some of its efficacy and must rely upon a greater degree of
coercion.
As a general proposition, citizens are presumed to know the law.
This presumption is patently unrealistic in the situation of imposed
law. 4 ' An indigenous scholar vividly describes the reality:
So when this unfortunate citizen has a case in these courts and the
judgment proclaims a law or right and duty necessarily outlandish to
him, he and members of the public of like circumstances would be
bewildered and in hopeless air say "Ndi Oyibo Ekwugo"-in Ibo,
meaning, "The English people have decided." Surely this is not the
ence less often referred to is the underlying structure of their respective economies. See gener-
ally K. NEWMAN, LAW AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
PREINDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES (1983); F. SNYDER, CAPITALISM AND LEGAL CHANGE: AN AFRI-
CAN TRANSFORMATION (1981).
139. See M. GLUCKMAN, THE IDEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE 267 (1965); Abel,
supra note 136, at 196; Allott, The Future of African Law, in AFRICAN LAW: ADAPTATION
AND DEVELOPMENT 216, 232-33 (H. Kuper & L. Kuper eds. 1965) [hereinafter AFRICAN
LAW]; Hoover, Piper, & Spalding, The Evolution of the Zambian Courts System, in LAW IN
ZAMBIA 47, 53 (M. Ndulo ed. 1984); von Brenda-Beckman, supra note 136, at 192; see also
Schott, supra note 138, at 76 (" 'Judgments in traditional courts are not simply the pronounce-
ments of the Chief or of one person: they are the collective wisdom of the entire village; the
decisions must reflect the general consensus of the community.' . . . This 'system of par-
ticipatory justice'... assures the control of the traditional courts and the acceptance of their
rulings by the people concerned.") But see Fallers, Administration and the Supremacy of Law
in Colonial Busoga, in SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND LAW 53, 59 (I. Hammett ed. 1977) (The
Soga legal institution places greater stress on applying the law than on settling the dispute.).
140. Smith, The Sociological Framework of Law, in AFRICAN LAW, supra note 139, at 24,
41.
141. Beckstrom, Transplantation of Legal Systems: An Early Report on the Reception of
Western Laws in Ethiopia, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 557, 571-72 (1973).
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attitude of a person who has obtained justice and the generality of the
public cannot say that apparent justice was obtained by him even
though the judgement was right in the law. . . . The judgment has
therefore no claim to having brought the dispute or matter in differ-
ence to finality. Peace has not enured from this judicial justice accord-
ing to the law of the land. Justice has not strengthened order and
stability or good government thereby.
142
Not only is this situation unfair to the individual, it challenges the legiti-
macy of law's common claims to educate or to establish a code of con-
duct, both of which can hardly be true if citizens are unaware. 
14 3
By logical deduction, if the transplanted law has a different cultural
base and the indigenous people are not aware of the law, their beliefs and
conduct will tend to diverge from the law's prescriptions.144 It cannot be
expected otherwise. The effects of this gap depend entirely on its width
and the length of time needed to close it, if indeed it can be closed. 
145
Whatever the consequences, including "outlawing" the conduct of the
populace, fostering anger or disrespect for the letter of the law, or render-
ing the law irrelevant, they can only be harmful.
Under these circumstances, the state must expend a greater degree
of effort and force if the influence of the law is to permeate throughout
society. "[I]t is because a rule is regarded as obligatory that a measure of
coercion may be attached to it; it is not obligatory because there is coer-
cion." '14 6 No state can perpetually marshall sufficient resources to insure
compliance where there is mass disobedience, incognizance, or indiffer-
ence to its laws.147 Thus, all societies rely to a large extent on the willing
142. Onyechi, A Problem of Assimilation of Dominance, in AFRICAN INDIGENOUS LAWS
268, 291 (T.O. Elias, S.N. Nwabara, & C.O. Akpamgbo eds. 1975).
143. Onyechi quotes a court opinion by Lord Chelmsford: "Our laws must grow having
our native laws, custom and practice as its ground norm so that citizens could properly be
expected and presumed to know and understand the laws of the land as the developed and
improved attitude, behavior and ethos of our indigenous society." Id. at 291 (citation
omitted).
144. See M. HOOKER, supra note 126, at 478-79 (discussing gap between law's descriptive
and prescriptive validity).
145. See Beckstrom, supra note 141, at 576-80 (potential problems with gap).
146. M. HOOKER, supra note 126, at 30.
147. See id. at 29-30 ("Indeed, Part II of Hoebel is a demonstration of the major contribu-
tion of sociological jurisprudence, that instead of positive law getting its sanction from a power
attached to itself, it only succeeds in attaching power to itself when the ethical content of its
norms correspond to the 'living law.' "); see also H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 48-89
(1961) (He discusses the fact that the bulk of people habitually obey a set of rules and ad-
dresses the difference between those who accept the normative authority of the rule and those
who do not but nevertheless abide due to fear of sanction.).
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cooperation of its members. When transplantation has occurred such re-
liance cannot be secure.
Each of the foregoing posed difficulties in one form or another for
colonial administrators. One strategy used to ameliorate these problems
was the recognition by the imposed law system of indigenous custom,
usually subject to a repugnancy clause.148 With independence, the indig-
enous people inherited the mixed law/custom system. After having lived
so long under the imposed law and with the indigenous lawmakers hav-
ing been educated in the Western tradition, they naturally continued the
same system, the only difference being a greater effort was made to ac-
commodate indigenous customs.' 49
A last point worthy of mention is one indirect consequence of trans-
plantation which in many areas increased following independence: the
wide socio-economic gap between those who know the imposed law sys-
tem and those who do not. This dichotomy tends to overlap with urban
versus rural,' 50 educated versus uneducated,"' wealthy elite versus
poor,152 and industrial versus subsistence, all subsumed under the rubric
of modern versus traditional.' 53 This condition of a people divided can-
not be attributed to the fact of transplantation alone. Pressure from the
need for economic development and longstanding, pre-existing divisions
contribute to the dichotomy in no small way. Nevertheless, the law fre-
quently serves as the battleground for the dispute and it operates to
maintain the disparity. It is neither the law of nor for everyone.
B. Custom and Customary Law
Prior to a review of the strategies adopted in response to the adverse
consequences of the imposition of law, the meaning of the terms custom
148. See generally M. HOOKER, supra note 126, at 119-89 (describing British colonial treat-
ment of customary law). This same approach was followed in Micronesia by the United
States. See I T.T.C. § 103 (1980).
149. See Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 130, at 148 ("Indeed, because the basic training of
most teachers, students, and policymakers in Africa remains Anglo-American and European,
western concepts, ideas, and models will, it appears, continue to dominate the legislative
processes of African countries for a long time.").
150. See Onyechi, supra note 142, at 290-91 (Villagers in the countryside live under tradi-
tional ways, unaware of state law.); von Brenda-Beckman, The Use of Folk Law in West Suma-
tran State Courts, in BELLAGIO PAPERS, supra note 136, at 77 (The imposed law is used
mainly in urban and semi-urban areas; the folk law is used in rural areas.).
151. See Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 130, at 148 (educated were familiar with law).
152. See id. at 148-49 (The policymakers are committed to economic development and
have a different set of values from those still living under system of indigenous order.).
153. See Snyder, Colonialism and Legal Form: The Creation of "Customary Law" in Sene-
gal, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 49, 75 (1981) (arguing that dichotomy between modern and
traditional is used for political and economic purposes).
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and customary law must be addressed. For the sake of expediency the
preceding discussion subsumed these terms within the idea of sublegal
system. These terms have defied precise delineation in the anthropologi-
cal literature, in part because their usage has been so varied. Webster's
Dictionary offers a broad definition of custom as "the whole body of us-
ages, practices, or conventions that regulate social life: usual manner and
method of living and doing." '15 4 It also defines custom more narrowly in
a way which smacks of Blackstone's formulation: "long established, con-
tinued, peaceable, reasonable, certain, and constant practice considered
as unwritten law and resting for authority on long consent: a usage that
has by long continuance acquired a legally binding force."' 55 As between
the two terms, the former sense of the word more closely aligns with
custom, the latter with customary law. Both definitions have been used
interchangeably. The quandary arises in distinguishing between the two
definitions, more specifically, in identifying what is customary law. Per-
haps in despair, one commentator suggested it is "conceptually mislead-
ing to distinguish between 'custom' and 'customary law.' "1I6
From entirely different perspectives, arguments have been pressed
by certain anthropologists that customary law is not customary at all, or
even not law. 5 7 Customary law becomes meaningful in the context of
imposed law where a state legal system is different from and in some
fashion coexists with a conflicting paradigm of social order adhered to by
a significant proportion of the people who live under the system. De-
154. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 559 (1976).
155. Id. Blackstone set forth the following criteria for custom to be recognized as common
law: 1) "it has been used so long that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary"; 2) "it
must have been continued"; 3) it must be "peaceable, and acquiesced in"; 4) it "may be good,
though, the particular reason of it cannot be assigned"; 5) it should be certain; 6) it must be
compulsory; and 7) "contradictory customs cannot both be good, nor both stand together." I
W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 127, 76-78 (1778).
156. Richstone, The Inuit and Customary Law, in INDIGENOUS LAW AND THE STATE,
supra note 126, at 239, 245.
157. Francis Snyder argues that customary law originated as an ideology that "accompa-
nied and formed a part of colonial domination," resulting from changes in social relations due
to the introduction of capitalism. Snyder, supra note 153, at 49-52. Martin Chanock suggests
that customary law was transformed during the colonial period as "part of an idealisation of
the past developed as an attempt to cope with social dislocation." M. CHANOCK, LAW, CUS-
TOM, AND SOCIAL ORDER 4 (1985). Lloyd Fallers contends that "[c]ustomary law is not so
much a kind of law as a kind of legal situation which develops in imperial or quasi-imperial
contexts in which dominant legal systems recognize and support the local law of politically
subordinate communities." L. FALLERS, LAW WITHOUT PRECEDENT 3 (1969). David Weis-
brot suggests that contemporary custom and customary law "is a product of discontinuity
during the colonial period, followed by a reinvention of 'traditional' culture to suit modem
needs." Weisbrot, supra note 133, at 39.
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pending on which viewpoint is taken, customary law serves as a symbol
either of domination by or independence under imposed law. '58
This leads back to the difficulty in distinguishing custom from cus-
tomary law. Webster's broader definition of custom is coextensive with
the entire regulation of social life. Social order in pre-state societies was
maintained by custom in this broad sense with no overt institution that
could be identified as "legal" in Western terms. Once it was recognized,
initially through the work of Malinowski,15 9 that pre-state societies did
indeed have the equivalent of our law, the question became how to distin-
guish within custom the norms, rules or institutions which were political,
moral or social from those which were legal. 1" To find a cross-cultural
way of identifying law was the goal. Adamson Hoebel formulated the
most influential early test: "[A] social norm is legal if its neglect or in-
fraction is regularly met, in threat or in fact, by the application of physi-
cal force by an individual or group possessing the socially recognized
privilege of so acting."' 1 A number of other tests have since been com-
posed.162 No single test has gained a majority of adherents. Some be-
lieve that distinctions between which norms are legal and which are not,
at least for certain groups, cannot be made,163 and that to do so is a
misleading ethnocentric exercise in imposing Western categories on non-
158. Burman, Persistence of Folk Law in India With Particular Reference to the Tribal
Communities, in INDIGENOUS LAW AND THE STATE, supra note 126, at 151, 158 ("It seemed
that people looked upon the unstructured status of customary laws as a symbol of their partial
independence, from the apparatus of the state..... ).
159. B. MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926).
160. Anthropologists interested in studying law on a comparative basis needed to be able to
distinguish these different types of norms. See L. PosPIsIL, supra note 129, at 40. ("In other
words, we have to define law by discovering characteristics that identify some of the author-
ity's decisions as legal, thus differentiating them from his statements and decisions that do not
deal with law.").
161. A. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 28 (1954).
162. Pospisil suggests there are four attributes to law: authority, intention of universal
application, obligatio, and sanction. L. POsPISIL, supra note 129, at 43. Fallers applies
H.L.A. Hart's concept of rule of recognition. Fallers, supra note 139, at 56 ("Primary legal
rules are those distinguished from the wider universe of moral norms by their union with
secondary rules of recognition, adjudication, and change.").
163. Compare Richstone, supra note 156, at 245 ("Along with certain other aboriginal peo-
ples, Inuit, for example, do not make distinctions between on the one hand, standards of beha-
viour or moral norms, and on the other, binding rules which are regularly visited with
sanctions or strictly regulated.") with I. GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE
BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA 173 (1955) ("Thus the Kuta has clearly in mind a distinc-
tion between obligations it can compel people to observe, and obligations it can only urge on
them as right. This gives the Lozi a distinctive body of legal rules which does not cover all
obligations which are approved as moral."). Clifford Geertz argues that legal norms cannot be
separated from facts, and challenges the way custom has been reduced to customary law. C.
GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLED.GE 173-75, 208 (1983).
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Western people. Beyond its value for academic purposes, the ability to
make this distinction is of material consequence in the imposed law situa-
tion where the dominant legal system affirmatively recognizes, in court
or by codification, that part of custom which is "law.""' If unable to
make this distinction, moral and social norms would be raised to the
status of law, an outcome that would pervert the custom.
One final point, ignored in the studies on this area, must be made
regarding when, in the imposed law context, the social and moral aspects
of custom must be separated from the legal. As just indicated, it is neces-
sary where custom becomes a part of the positive law of the dominant
legal system. However, this separation need not be made when the domi-
nant legal system preserves the custom by a negative method, that is, by
setting a limitation on the dominant law itself such that it cannot be
construed or applied in a manner inconsistent with custom.'6 5 Admit-
tedly, such self-imposed limits on the dominant legal system are uncom-
mon. Nevertheless, when this is the case, whether a custom is considered
moral, social, or legal does not matter. The law must still be consistent
with custom whatever its underlying nature.
C. Strategies Applied to Imposed Law Situations
Three strategies have been used, either in combination or individu-
ally, to bring indigenous mechanisms of social order under custom within
the ambit of the dominant legal system: (1) codification of customary
law norms; (2) use by state courts of customary law as a source of law in
a fashion analogous to common law and (3) creation of informal "native"
or "village" courts which apply predominantly customary law. Each of
these three strategies suffers from various defects. These individual de-
fects aside, they all suffer from the same critical flaw which makes them
incapable of providing a complete solution. The flaw in these strategies is
in their aim. Custom cannot be removed from its original medium to be
placed in another and still maintain its integrity.
An extreme reason offered for why this cannot be done is that the
essence of social order in pre-state societies lies in the complex of rela-
164. David, Critical Observations Regarding the Potentialities and the Limitations of Legis-
lation in the Independent African States, in INTEGRATION OF CUSTOMARY AND MODERN
LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AFRICA 43, 46-49 (1971) [hereinafter INTEGRATION] (against codifying
those customs which deal solely with personal relations); Grant, Recognition of Traditional
Laws in State Courts and the Formulation of State Legislation, in INDIGENOUS LAW AND THE
STATE, supra note 126, at 259, 260 (using a modified form of Hoebel's test to identify which
customs should be codified).
165. See Tamanaha, supra note 14, at 89-94 (provision in Yap Constitution which provides
that the constitution may not be interpreted to invalidate any recognized custom).
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tions and social processes, not in norms or rules: 166
An adequate account of a dispute therefore requires a description of its
total social context-its genesis, successive efforts to manage it, and
the subsequent history of the relationship between the parties....
... [I]ndigenous rules are not seen a priori as "laws" that have the
capacity to determine the outcome of disputes in a straightforward
fashion. It is recognized, rather, that the rules may themselves be the
object of negotiation and may sometimes be a resource to be managed
advantageously. 167
Under this view, it is inherently impossible to incorporate the customary
system of order (other than by merely not interfering with it) because it is
an irremoveable aspect of social life. To extract only the rules would be
useless.
A less extreme version recognizes the weight of the norms, but as-
serts that they function properly only within the traditional dispute reso-
lution process. 161 "The essence of the customary systems may be said to
have lain in their processes, but these were displaced, and the flexible
principles which had guided them were now fed into a rule-honing and
-using machine operating in new political circumstances." 169
A final reason why custom resists codification and use in court fo-
cuses on the nature of the norms themselves. The problems identified
with norms, a sampling of which is set forth below, all follow a recurring
theme that relates to the discussion of norms in the preceding section.
Assuming that customary norms can be identified and labeled as such,170
they have been found to be in a state of flux with different versions;1 71
166. See J. COMAROFF & S. ROBERTS, RULES AND PROCESSES: THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF
DISPUTE IN AN AFRICAN CONTEXT 11-17 (1981).
167. Id at 13-14.
168. See von Brenda-Beckman, supra note 150, at 87 ("In village processes of decision
making the substantive content of a norm therefore is not sharply distinguished from the
decisionmaking process in which the norm is used, even though this 'procedural' aspect is not
explicit in the norm statement."). Norms are guidelines for decisions rather than clear pre-
scriptions. Zion, Searching for Indian Common Law, in INDIGENOUS LAW AND THE STATE,
supra note 126, at 121, 129 ("First and foremost, the Indian common law is procedural. It
deals with relationships, mutual obligations.... This is not to say that there is no substantive
law.").
169. M. CHANOCK, supra note 157, at 62.
170. See Woodman, Customary Law, State Courts, and the Notion of Institutionalization of
Norms in Ghana and Nigeria, in BELLAGIO PAPERS, supra note 136, at 143, 154-55 (Norms
cannot be given precise meaning when isolated from their function in the entire body of legal
rules.).
171. Burman, supra note 158, at 158.
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there are conflicting or contradictory norms;17 2 norms are described in a
"vague or elusive" manner; 173 norms have multiple contingencies or ex-
ceptions; 17 4 stated norms often do not match actual behavior;175 it is not
always clear how to move from the abstract norm to application in a
given case;17 6 and sometimes a number of normative orders coexist. 177
Though this description might indicate to the Western ear that the
rules are arbitrary, all of these characteristics are actually a reflection of
the flexibility of normative systems which functioned well within their
original habitat, but which chafe against the "rule of law" orientation of
courts and defy the inherent rigidity of codification. "[T]he norms can-
not retain their original content as components of a different system." 178
Whether the technique of incorporation used is codification, 179 state
172. Bentsi-Enchill, The Colonial Heritage of Legal Pluralism (The British Scheme), [1 No.
2] ZAMBIA L.J. 1, 23 (1969).
173. M. CHANOCK, supra note 157, at 63.
174. A. NEKAM, EXPERIENCES IN AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 4-5 (1966); see also S.
Moore, Descent and Legal Position, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 374, 376 (L. Nader ed.
1969) ("[T]he more multiplex the social relations, the more contingencies there are that may
affect any particular act or transaction. This multiplicity not only makes it difficult to state the
norms precisely, but sometimes may make it impossible, since the assortment of contingencies
can vary so much from one case to another.").
175. See M. CHANOCK, supra note 157, at 17. Sally Falk Moore argues that this diver-
gence "is not a matter of ideal-real dichotomies, nor of norms and violations. On the contrary,
such 'exceptions' are part of the system. They are legitimate alternatives to other arrange-
ments and there is legal provision for them." S. Moore, Introduction, Comparative Studies, in
LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, supra note 174, at 347-48.
176. Comaroff & Roberts, The Invocation of Norms in Dispute Settlement: The Tswana
Case, in SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND LAW, supra note 139, at 77, 79.
177. Id. at 80. Lest we forget, many of these same characteristics of norms, including their
divergence from actual behavior, their conflicting nature, the difficulty in going from the ab-
stract to application, and the existence of conflicting normative orders, has also been observed
to exist in western legal systems. See G. CHRISTIE, LAW, NORMS AND AUTHORITY 2-31
(1982).
178. Woodman, supra note 170, at 157 (Woodman argues that there is "sociologist's cus-
tomary law" and "lawyer's customary law" and that the two are always different.).
179. The hurdle this flexibility poses for codification are particularly insurmountable. One
commentator explains why:
What seems the most misleading about these attempted codifications of customary
law is not that the formulated rules would, in themselves, be necessarily wrong, but
that they are fatally incomplete. For every 'rule' assumed, there are hundreds over-
looked, 'rules' which would qualify those stated, balance them, enlarge them or nar-
row them down. An enormous proliferation of rules will be needed if one insists on
proceeding that way and no outsider will ever be able to do it.
A. NEKHAM, supra note 174, at 147; see also Burman, supra note 158, at 159 (Efforts at codifi-
cation "have not met with much success.").
Another difficulty for codification is there are different customs for different areas,
whereas codification tends toward uniformity because it must cover broad areas. See
Chisholm, Aboriginal Law in Australia: The Law Reform Commission's Proposal for Recogni-
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courts,18 0 or village courts (which, despite their informality, are not in-
digenous institutions), 8 this problem cannot be overcome.18 2
Where these strategies have nonetheless been adopted, use of custom
has, as a matter of substance, been limited to land law, family law, and
inheritance law. It has not often been applied in the context of torts,
contracts, or commercial law. 183 In criminal law, custom has most fre-
quently been treated as a cultural fact considered in mitigation.184 These
limitations are a further legacy of the colonial period, during which cus-
tomary law was allowed to apply to those areas that were seen as "tradi-
tional," but not to the "modem" areas which came with the nimposed
legal system. 85 This pattern continued in most areas after independence.
lion, 10 U. HAW. L. REv. 47, 64-66 (1988); Tanner, The Codification of Customary Law in
Tanzania, 2 E. AFR. L.J. 105, 114 (1966) ("Many sections are contrary to customary law or
unknown to customary law as it is now known, some sections being based on the law of one
tribe only."); Woodman, supra note 170, at 147.
180. See J.S. FURNIVALL, supra note 136, at 295 ("Unwritten custom changes its character
when formalized in law and legal decisions .... Indigenous law or custom administered in a
foreign court is no less foreign than law proceeding directly from a foreign ruler.").
A separate handicap for courts is their restrictive nature, the limitations on types of ac-
tions, evidence, available remedies, etc., none of which apply to customary systems. See Hoo-
ver, Piper, & Spalding, supra note 139, at 53; von Brenda-Beckman, supra note 150, at 86-87.
Finally, courts have difficulty with the ascertainment of custom. Under colonial rule the
judges were foreigners who did not know the native laws, and thus the applicable law had to be
established by evidence. See Bentsi-Enchill, supra note 172, at 21-24. This became less of a
problem with native judges, who are presumed to know the native law. Id. One aspect of this
which cannot be avoided is the different customs from different areas, the judge being familiar
with his own customs. See Woodman, supra note 170, at 144-47.
181. See Huber, supra note 135, at 162 (village courts different from traditional institution)
("[Tihe whole new style surrounding modem dispute settlement procedure seems to have
alienated these courts from the people."); Singer, The Subtlety of Legal Change: A Lesson From
Northern Zambia, in BELLAGIO PAPERS, supra note 136, at 109, 116 (local court process and
demeanor not traditional); Westermark, Court is an Arrow: Legal Pluralism in Papua New
Guinea, 25 ETHNOLOGY 131, 132-38 (1986) (Village courts tend to follow modem style even
though informal.).
182. Akin to this need for flexibility is that codification or court recognition of norms,
through the process of writing and stare decisis, have the effect of freezing the norm in a form
that would otherwise have naturally undergone change over time. Thus, a gap develops be-
tween the legal norm and the customary norm from which it was derived. See Kludze, Evolu-
tion of the Different Regimes of Customary Law in Ghana within the Framework of the Principle
of Stare Decisis, in BELLAGIO PAPERS, supra note 136, at 97, 99; Woodman, supra note 170, at
150-54 ("By reason of stare decisis there persists today in Ghana rules supposedly of the cus-
tomary law, but totally alien.").
183. See Allott, A Note on Previous Conferences on African Law, in INTEGRATION, supra
note 164, at 4-10; Crawford, Hennessy, & Fisher, Aboriginal Customary Laws: Proposals for
Recognition, in INDIGENOUS LAW AND THE STATE, supra note 126, at 27, 45-49.
184. See Crawford, Hennessy, & Fisher, supra note 183, at 49-52; Dinnen, supra note 138,
at 27-49.
185. See L. FALLERS, supra note 157, at 61-65.
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Its effect is to bind custom and set it apart:
[It] marks a peculiarly unimaginative approach to native law and cus-
tom, putting a brake upon, rather than encouraging the development
of, that law on lines analogous to that of the common law. Novel situ-
ations and transactions are forever emerging and there is no living sys-
tem of law that is without gaps .... [I]t effectually places a veto on
such development [of native law] ....
Attempts to expand custom beyond land law, inheritance law, and family
law have been few and largely unsuccessful.1 87
The cumulative effect of these strategies is to further solidify the
dualistic schism described earlier. Customary law and state law are
placed at either end of a divide with no bridge between. This divide is
reinforced by the separation between state courts and customary courts,
and within state courts by the separation between custom as a source of
law and all other sources of law.18 8 Evidence of this divide can be seen in
proliferation of choice of law rules, specifying when and to whom cus-
tomary law is to apply. I s9 Thus, even in those countries where a signifi-
cant body of customary law has been developed and "integrated" into the
legal system, the ultimate outcome is still a perpetuation of the initial
dichotomy which resulted from imposition. It has even been suggested
that incorporation of custom is a subtle, painless way to actually
marginalize or eliminate it.190
186. Bentsi-Enchill, supra note 172, at 27.
187. Customary law of torts has had greater success than contracts, commercial law, and
criminal law, though even in torts Western models are used as the base and customary law as
the modifier. See Allott, The Codification of the Law of Civil Wrongs in Common-Law African
Countries, in INTEGRATION, supra note 164, at 169; see also Epstein, Injury and Liability in
African Customary Law in Zambia, in IDEAS AND PROCEDURES IN AFRICAN CUSTOMARY
LAW 292 (M. Gluckman ed. 1969) [hereinafter IDEAS]; Ibik, The Customary Law of Wrongs
and Injuries in Malawi, in IDEAS, supra, at 305. Even less has been done in the area of con-
tracts. See Ghai, Customary Contracts and Transactions in Kenya, in IDEAS, supra at 333;
Nwabueze, Integration of the Law of Contracts, in INTEGRATION, supra note 164, at 135;
Schapera, Contract in Tswana Law, in IDEAS, supra, at 318.
188. Agu, The Dualism of English and Customary Laws in Nigeria, in AFRICAN INDIGE-
NOUS LAWS, supra note 142, at 252, 264 ("What I am protesting about is the current system
whereby English Law and Courts and customary law and Courts are allowed to, as it were,
maintain their separate existence in our legal system-like parallel streams whose waters never
mix.").
189. See Bentsi-Enchill, supra note 172, at 24-29.
190. See Dinnen, supra note 138, at 21 ("From such a perspective the 'integration' of 'cus-
tom' within the official legal system almost invariably leads to the marginalisation of custom
through its subordination to the rules and procedures of the introduced system."); Singer,
supra note 181, at 111 ("The government of Zambia has introduced a modem system for the
administration of justice while it professes to continue to support the traditional or customary
[Vol. 13
Indigenous Jurisprudence in Micronesia
IV. PROPOSAL FOR THE FEDERATED STATES OF
MICRONESIA
Early indications in the FSM offer convincing reasons to believe that
the FSM may be embarking on a path that leads to frustration, if it has
not already reached that point. The preceding survey strongly suggests
that one should be suspicious of that thing called "customary law." It
appears that customary law is an invention of recent vintage, derived
from the attempt to fit Western conceptual categories onto different sys-
tems of social order, and to absorb and encompass the indigenous sys-
tem. This does not make customary law any less real, particularly to the
many indigenous people who believe in it, but it does suggest that the
concept and its role deserve reevaluation when the colonial imposers
have left. Of course, this departure alone does not in any way obliterate
the changes wrought during their stay. Ensuing political and social
changes dictate that the indigenous people cannot go back to precolonial
ways. An enduring consequence is the real necessity after independence
to retain major aspects of the transplanted legal system.
Yet, what they can do is question the inherited antithesis between
customary law and the imposed law; to maintain it is nothing less than a
self-imposed perpetuation of the colonial legacy. This distinction does
not exist in areas free from a colonial past, where custom and legal sys-
tem are combined, each a reflection of the other. Although attachment to
customary law as an ideal previously served the important functions of
providing a shared sense of identity and independence from the imposed
legal system, to continue the division merely alienates people from what
now is and must be their own legal system. What was once a positive
feature has, by virtue of a handing over of the reins, become a negative
one.
In addition to customary law, the concept of custom must also be
scrutinized. Custom continued to thrive under colonial rule, albeit al-
tered in many ways, and it exists today. At most, law effects, only partial
order. 191 Custom, in. the broad sense of the regulation of social life must
exist or the society would not exist, at least not without an unsustainable
use of coercive force by the state. Thus, custom is not threatened by an
imposed legal system so much as a particular kind of custom (the present
way of social order) also known as tradition, the ways of the past in the
forms that have survived until now. That is why the phrases customary
system.") The people belieye their traditional system of law is in operation, but in practice it
has been undermined. Id at 118.
191. See S. MOORE, supra note 133, at 1-9.
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ways and traditional ways are often used synonomously. These phrases,
which harken to the past, are misleading since both custom and tradition
are dynamic processes that continually update to the present. Rather
than view them as being linked to a particular time they should be seen
as a continuous thread. In most societies, law and custom (tradition)
develop simultaneously, but in the imposed law situation they do not.
Although law is perceived as a constant threat to tradition (custom), in
reality they have coexisted for some time, at least since the initial imposi-
tion. Properly seen, the cry for custom is really an expression of angst
about the continuing mismatch and fear that it may be worsened, not a
request to revive traditions or ways of doing things long expired.
This conclusion leads to an assertion that at first blush may seem
counterintuitive: the error in all of the strategies applied thus far is their
very focus on custom and customary law. These strategies inevitably
drown in the blurry morass which makes up custom and norms of cus-
tomary law. Even where customs or norms have been identified (at best
approximately), what to do with them becomes another question. Since
they have altered by virtue of the extraction, they would not operate in
the same fashion in the legal system, and the mechanisms of social order
have not stood still in the interim. The end result of this spent time and
effort is the same imposed legal system with a small room, strictly com-
partmentalized, reserved for the inclusion of things which resemble what
used to be customs. These integrated "customs" are anachronisms
which in no way advance against the real problem, the underlying mis-
match, while in the process the dualism is worsened.
Over time, under indigenous self-government, and if allowed to
evolve without interference, the legal and social systems will move to-
ward one another to form a unique, more comfortable fit. 192 Still, the
final form of that fit is very much at stake. It can shade toward indige-
nous or shade toward Western depending upon the forces at play during
the formative evolutionary stages. If the FSM Supreme Court continues
along the path it has chosen, the period of merging will be prolonged
with greater dislocation and the final form will lean toward Western.
This proposal, if implemented, will remove the barrier of dualism caused
by the focus on customary law and will nudge the evolutionary develop-
ment in a direction toward more indigenous.
First, there must be a change in attitude. The goal must be to de-
192. See Chiba, supra note 134, at 389 ("[T]he originally received law often tends, as hy-
pothesized in the Introduction, to be converted in a long course of assimilation into law which
may reasonably be called indigenous.").
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velop a system of indigenous jurisprudence, not to preserve custom or
customary law. These latter concerns, which will nevertheless indirectly
benefit, must be relegated to the background. For this attitude to have
an impact, the judges must be indigenous. Without this starting point,
this proposal has no chance of success.
The basic idea behind this proposal is to inject the indigenous cul-
ture back into the legal system through the human element. The seminal
part of the proposal, from which all other aspects flow, is a new, central
rule of decision for cases. Rather than applying the law, the judge's ob-
jective (the rule of decision) should be "to do right." This standard "to
do right" is carefully chosen and means just that; it does not mean to do
justice. The judge must decide what he thinks is the right outcome, then
work backward to find justifications for this outcome. These justifica-
tions may be drawn from written law, past decisions, common law, cus-
tom, social norms, the exercise of reason, or even just common sense.
The only requirement is that they be articulated in an explanatory fash-
ion in support of the decision. If these sources do not support the judge's
initial outcome, he must alter his decision to one which can be supported.
Each case is to be treated individually and no case has any meaning be-
yond its bounds, so stare decisis has no application. There is little that
can be said about the standard "to do right" other than that everyone
knows what it means. Judges possessed of the characteristics of intelli-
gence and integrity will have internalized the mores of their culture as
well as the mores of their institutional role, and therefore, their decisions
will be both fair and felt by the people to be fair. Of paramount impor-
tance will be the selection of judges. Without faith in the people who
make up institutions, no system, no matter how well designed, can
function.
Statutes are entitled to primacy and should be applied unless the
outcome would be other than what is "right." If this should be the case,
in a fashion similar to how equity operates, "right" must prevail over
written law, accompanied by a detailed explanation. The Constitution is
to be a guiding document and ordinarily all decisions should be consis-
tent with it, although it is not to be read in a style of strict interpretation.
This less rigorous reading recognizes the reality that the Micronesian
Constitution was written in a foreign language (English) by foreigners
(Americans) who borrowed from another constitution (the United States
Constitution). The same is also true of many of their laws. Formalisms
and interpretive fictions have no place in this proposal. For example, the
FSM Supreme Court's current practice of distinguishing United States
Supreme Court cases issued before the Micronesian Constitution Con-
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vention from those issued after, based on the patent fiction that the dele-
gates endorsed the opinions which came before, must be repudiated.
Although the delegates were generally aware of the plain English mean-
ing of the provisions borrowed from the United States Constitution, they
did not know the legal meaning as determined by American courts. All
opinions of the United States Supreme Court should have the same value.
They are just another source of information to be considered in deciding
what is the best interpretation for Micronesia. After all, since United
States courts have more than a few times reinterpreted the language of
the American Constitution, there is no reason why the FSM cannot in-
terpret the same language in a the way that best fits, rather than accept
that the words have some particular meaning. For the FSM, the slate is
clean with no meanings predetermined, regardless of the source or simi-
larity of language.
This proposal shifts the orientation of the system away from the
individual towards the collective. This is one reason why "to do justice"
is not the rule of decision. The quest for justice imparts a sense of some
standard above the community. "To do right," which will for the most
part overlap with what Westerners would say is just, falls squarely upon
the judge, whose standards are of the culture. Assuming the culture is
oriented more toward the collective than the individual, the judge's sense
of what is "right" will reflect that orientation. The outcome determina-
tive nature of the rule of decision will result in an almost immediate clo-
sure of the gap between law and social system. People will no longer see
the law as an alien system because the outcome of legal disputes will
match their sense of what is correct.
The most basic of the many objections which come to mind about
this proposal is the seemingly absolute discretion of the judge. Although
the judge has a substantial amount of discretion, arguably he has not
much more than that held by judges in the United States system. Fur-
thermore, there are significant restraints which render his discretion far
from absolute. As Jerome Frank observed:
In theory, the judge begins with some rule or principle of law as his
premise, applies this premise to the facts, and thus arrives at his
decision.
... Judicial judgments, like other judgments, doubtless, in most
cases, are worked out backward from conclusions tentatively
formulated.
... What then is the part played by legal rules and principles? We
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have seen that one of their chief uses is to enable the judges to give
formal justifications-rationalizations--of the conclusions at which
they otherwise arrive .... 193
Even those who believe that Judge Frank understated the influence of
rules in coming to a decision and overstated the ability of judges to ma-
nipulate rules and precedents would concede that they do have much
room to move, and that constraints are largely provided by other than
the rules themselves.1 94 Thus, this proposal may be giving up less than it
appears.
Part of the constraint on judges will be their perception of their in-
stitutional role and their felt allegiance to the rule of law. This proposal
recognizes and relies on the fact that the judges will have been educated
in the law and this education will have to some extent shaped their out-
look. They must be fully appreciative of the fact that it is a democratic
society, and they may depart from written law "to do right" only when
necessary. They must also recognize that a critical aspect of law is con-
sistency and predictability. The requirement of explaining their rulings
will help insure that they are not arbitrary.
The most important constraint comes from the nature of small is-
land societies. An indigenous judge will be part of the community in the
way that American judges are not. The judge indirectly answers to and
has responsibility toward the community. As a leader of the community,
the judge will have obligations of honor wrapped up in the position, such
that the judge's self-image, as well as the community's perception, will be
strong guarantors of proper conduct. To enhance accountability, judges
should be appointed to a short initial term not exceeding four years, then
be up for reappointment every ten years. This will insure that the judge
is responsive to the demands of the other branches of government. A
final check will be provided by the appellate level. The appellate panel
should be comprised of three indigenous judges, and a case may be over-
turned if there is unanimous agreement that the decision was "not right."
For this system to work, judges must be persons of integrity and intelli-
gence.1 95 Again, these are basic requirements which apply everywhere,
193. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 101, 130 (1936); see also Hutcheson, The
Judgment Intuitive: The Functions of the "'Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274
(1929).
194. See G. AICHELE, LEGAL REALISM AND TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICAN JURIS-
PRUDENCE: THE CHANGING CONSENSUS 118-54 (1983) (These constraints include the judge's
perception of their institutional role, the requirement of providing written opinions explaining
their decisions, the process of "reasoned elaboration," and the existence of appellate courts as
checks.).
195. This proposal does not directly address the problems of corruption or accumulation of
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in every system.
On the state level, there are no serious obstacles to this proposal.
The national courts deal on a broader basis and there is a greater need for
uniformity. Such uniformity would naturally come about, despite the
differences among the states, because there is a shared sense of what is
Micronesian. Any disagreements may be resolved at the appellate level.
Also, there should be a Supreme Court Justice from each of the four
states, hearing cases in their home state, so that the judge is a member of
the community. The judge must keep in mind, however, that his true
constituency is the broader community of the entire four states.
Critics may assert that the needs of economic development and the
modern world will not allow for such a system. A judge will undoubt-
edly take such matters into account in deciding "what is right." Capital-
ism has proven to be quite adaptable and it will assuredly survive the
more flexible system envisioned. Choice of law rules will not be neces-
sary because the nature of the parties in each case, their backgrounds,
and their understandings will all be considered. The judges may be
called upon to make political decisions, yet this is an irreducible element
of all systems, and the benefit of this proposal is that it is not hidden.
A few structural adjustments must also be made. The jurisdiction of
the FSM Supreme Court should be narrowed, and the restrictions of the
adversary system softened. Considering the lack of attorneys, the judge
must take a more assertive role in getting to the heart of a dispute. He or
she could independently call for the presentation of information neces-
sary to render a considered decision. The judge should not be restricted
to the common law causes of action and remedial power may also be
expanded. Whatever other changes may occur should be guided by the
rule of decision: to do "what is right" in a given case. The spirit under-
lying the proposal is a merging of form and substance through a general
softening of "legalisms."
Although customary law, as such, will not have special status, in
operation, custom will play a far greater role than it does now. Because
the judge is indigenous, he or she will know better what the customs are
and how they influence the matter at hand. Evidence of custom need not
be submitted, and the burden of proof will not apply. The variation of
custom among areas will be less of a problem because the judge, even if
power by judges. The system proposed would not suffer from corruption any more than the
existing one because the "rule of law" orientation it supplants does not of itself provide direct
checks against corruption. The guard against the accumulation of power is the continuing
balance between the branches of government. The court is a political institution and judges
will be sensitive to any loss of credibility or support from the other branches.
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not familiar with the customs of a particular area, will know how to
ascertain what these variations are and their effect. Moreover, with time,
legal counsel will become more adept at raising custom as a source of
decision. Custom used in a decision will not become binding, affirmative
law under this proposal. The only question is whether it should apply in
the case at hand to arrive at "what is right." Whether custom is consid-
ered law or fact, or a social, moral, or legal norm, will be of no conse-
quence. They will all equally be the means to an outcome in a given
case-applied so they comport with the general sense of "what is right."
Application in a given case will be done in a way that approximates what
the original effect of the custom was, even if it looks very different and
may not even be called a custom at all.
Under this proposal, despite the no stare decisis rule and the appar-
ent freedom of the judge, a consistent body of indigenous jurisprudence
should develop over time which closely reflects the underlying culture
and social order. This assertion is based on the tendency of legal and
social order to move toward one another, combined with the practical
demands on the judicial process of efficiency and predictability. This
body of jurisprudence will contain many aspects of custom, because cus-
tom will often be the most readily available source of justification. It will
contain a substantial body of common law rules for the same reason.
These sources will blend in a way that ultimately does not distinguish
between them. Optimistic as this scenario may be, it is really just an
extension of what the Pohnpei State Court has done in the cases de-
scribed earlier.
It is instructive that many early decisions of the United States
Supreme Court contain scant citation to authority. Everything was
worked out one case at a time until the decisions began to build on one
another. The FSM Supreme Court can and must do the same. In sup-
port of borrowing from American case law, it may be argued that every-
thing need not be reinvented since the system of laws has already been
figured out elsewhere. But the flip side of this rationale for not engaging
in original, creative analysis is that the Micronesian people are then
trapped by political decisions embodied in law, worked out to fit a place
not their own.
The long term benefit of this proposal is that the legal system will
not develop the characteristic dualism so evident in other areas suffering
the consequences of imposed law. The body of laws will be a single body
that applies equally to everyone. It will be a body of law that everyone,
whether educated or not, will know, with results they can both under-
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stand and accept as right, even if they have had no contact with the legal
system.
V. CONCLUSION
Only the Micronesians can decide what is best for them, what sys-
tem of laws they wish to live under, what will, and will not work. The
analysis of FSM Supreme Court decisions clearly shows that the wish
they expressed for a more Micronesian law has not occured. Their sys-
tem in its entirety is derived from United States constitutional law and
common law, just as it was during the Trust Territory. With indepen-
dence did not come their own legal system. Micronesia must take affirm-
ative steps, the first of which would be to replace the American judges on
the court with Micronesian judges. This step alone would not effect sub-
stantial change since the system is already in place and it is difficult for
even indigenous lawyers to overcome their predilection toward common
law and the American legal style embedded by their legal education.
This proposal recognizes and relies upon this element of Westernization,
and merges it with the indigenous to form a hybrid that more closely
matches the western-but-not and indigenous-but-not society that they
have. Radical as this proposal may sound, it is intended to generate
thought and debate, to challenge assumptions that there are certain ways
the law works, to imagine the possibilities rather than follow the same
ineffective and harmful technique of incorporating norms of customary
law into the imposed legal system. The Micronesians wanted judicial
decisions to be consistent with the "customs and traditions, and the so-
cial and geographical configuration of Micronesia."' 96 This directive is
much broader than the incorporation of a few norms. If this wish is to
become a reality, the system itself must be examined. Nothing less will
do.
196. FSM CONST. art. XI, § 11.
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